The CRPF - Naxal Battle at Sukma, Chattisgarh

On 1st December a CRPF force, while carrying out area sanitising operations in Chintagufa area of Sukma District of Chattisgarh State, was ambushed by Naxals. Two officers and 11 troopers were killed and another 14 injured as per news reports. The operations involved Number 206 and 223 CRPF Battalions supported by CRPF COBRA units and SPOs, all put togather amounting to around 4000 troops. Their objective was to clear certain areas of Sukma distrct. The operation was presumably launched for the reason that a NSA team led by Mr Shyam Sharan was present in Chattisgarh to evaluate the Naxal situation and was scheduled to visit Dantewada and Bastar areas on 1st December. Both areas lie in close proximity to Sukma District.  From another media report one can deduce that the operations were led by IG HS Siddhu and so it would have been a big affair.

First contact with Naxals was established at 11.30 AM  on 1st December and the CRPF force finally withdrew and returned to their camp at Chintagufa the same day by 9.30 PM, having collected their dead and wounded. Reading between the lines in the news reports, the extrication of casualties had to be led by the IG himself.

Ellamgunda forest, where the contact took place lies 10-12 KMs from the CRPF camp at Chintagufa. The Naxals were reported to be about 400 in number. From the available inputs the following aspects pertaining to the operation can be discerned.

Firstly, the CRPF is not being able to effectively dominate areas beyond the immediate vicinity of their camp such that almost 400 Naxals were operating within 10 KMs of their camp and had also mined the area with IEDs. This indicates inadequate patrolling and area domination. It appears that CRPF is largely restricted to their camps.

Secondly, the night lies with the Naxal. Having established contact with a 400 strong Naxal force at 11.30 AM, the brigade sized CRPF force should have persisted with the contact and developed the operation to inflict heavy casualties to the Naxals, capture prisoners and at end of the day, retain possession of the battle ground.  In conventional terms such an operation would have lasted about 72 - 96 hours. However, we find that the CRPF force withdrew to their camp with great difficulty by 9.30 PM after extricating their casualties. It is obvious that the CRPF was not willing to persist with anti Naxal operations at night.

This is a serious matter. This is possibly the first time that the Naxals have taken to give conventional battle to a major CPO force, inflict serious casualties on them and thereafter force them into a withdrawal. The CRPF brigade sized force was handed a severe setback in battle. The term battle is used with deliberation. The CRPF and Naxals have for the first time fought a deliberate battle, where the CRPF would have had to conduct offensive manoeuvre operations to clear the Naxals and were bettered by the Naxals. So it seems the Naxal movement has moved on to the next level of communist guerrilla warfare, that is, from hit and run raids and ambushes to deliberate operations against government forces. We will increasingly see this trend manifesting itself and it calls for some serious recalibration of government forces response.

Thirdly, there are reports that the IAF helicopters were not used for casualty evacuation. However, from media reports it can be made out that till as late as 5 PM in the evening the casualties had not been extricated from the area of contact. It appears that the IG himself had to lead a force to pull out the casualties. This does not speak well for the battalions in contact that they were unable to pull out their own casualties. There appear to be serious issue of lack of morale, motivation and battle attitude in CPOs. Obviously, at this late hour helicopters would have been unable to undertake a mission over uncleared areas despite the fact that the Mi 17 1V's have night flying capability.

An objective analysis of this CRPF operation and the performance of BSF in tackling border violations as discussed in my earlier post, indicates that the CPOs are gravely lacking in capability to participate in hybrid operations that will be the norm in the coming times. The nature of hybrid warfare would require that the forces have capability akin to light infantry with the battle attitude of closing and destroying the adversary. The attitude is missing and is reflected in the precipitate withdrawal of an IG led CRPF force of around 4000 all ranks, to the safety of their camp. Recently four Pak terrorists broke through BSF manned border fence in Samba area. The BSF called in the army rather than take on the terrorists themselves. The BSF is a 187 battalion force, whereas CRPF is a 232 battalion force as per wikipedia. Together they constitute a force equivalent of approximately 46 infantry divisions. Forces of immense numbers, as big if not bigger than Indian Army, equipped in a similar manner as regular infantry of Indian Army with same rifles, LMGs, MMGs, Rocket launchers, motors, NVDs, BFSRs and et al that goes with an infantry unit. However they are observed to be entirely lacking in a viable operational capability that would enable them to handle home grown threats like the Naxals, the to be expected ISIS clones or cross border Afgan/ Pak militants, who could be expected in larger numbers once the US forces in Afghanistan draw down. In all such conditions there will be pressure to call in Indian Army.

The CPOs lack battle spirit. Over time they have drifted away from the army ethos and have increasingly adopted a police like ethos. They have no space for personnel from the Indian Army within their organisation which logically should have been the case. There is a pressing requirement to take a re look at our homeland security organisation. The immense expenditure being incurred on CPOs is bearing little fruit. It is time that that the government set up an inter disciplinary team to arrive at emerging nature of threats and the organisation of forces to deal with them.


 

 

Failure of Indian Military Leadership in 1962 Sino Indian Conflict : A Re Look

"THE SAFETY  HONOUR AND WELFARE OF YOUR COUNTRY COME FIRST ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME. THE HONOUR, WELFARE  AND COMFORT OF THE MEN YOU COMMAND COME NEXT. YOUR OWN EASE, COMFORT  AND SAFETY COME LAST, ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME."

Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode

IMA,10th December 1932

On 21st November 1962, sixty two years ago, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced a withdrawal to pre conflict lines, thus bringing to an end the Sino Indian conflict of 1962. Earlier the cadence of Sino Indian border dispute had erupted into a full blown border war on 20th October 1962, with the Chinese PLAA attacking and destroying Indian 7 Infantry Brigade on the Namka Chu rivulet in Tawang sector, in a matter of few hours. By 22nd October the historic monastery town of Tawang had been evacuated and fell to the Chinese.  After a tactical pause, combat operations resumed on 17th November. By 19th November, the PLAA had completed the destruction of the Indian 4 Infantry Division capturing in the process the formidable mountain passes of Se La and Bomdi La, each defended by an Indian infantry brigade and thereon advancing beyond Tenga. The plains of Assam lay open to Chinese occupation.  Prime Minister Nehru gave out his farewell "our hearts go out to the people of Assam" speech and Tezpur was evacuated.

The unilateral ceasefire declared by the Chinese on 21st November brought an end to this sordid and humiliating saga that saw the nadir of Indian force-at-arms. Sordid, as it represented a total failure of Indian military leadership and humiliating as India plaintively approached world powers to bail her out of her predicament.  The disgrace of Indian Army and the Indian Armed Forces was complete and the nation humbled and in shock.

Even today, after a lapse of sixty two years Indian military professionals wince at the mention of the 1962 war and the reverberations of that conflict ring loud and hard in the ears of present day Indian civil and military leadership. Our current dealings with China are in a major way influenced and shaped by that experience. In my opinion, as an army we are yet to expurgate the humiliation of that defeat, as we are still to acknowledge the underlying single most important reason for this defeat . That reason was complete and total failure of military leadership at all levels i.e strategic, operational and tactical. Other reasons were peripheral.

Tensions between India and China had been building up since mid 1950's when it was discovered that China had occupied Indian territory of Aksai Chin and had constructed a road in 1956 across the region, connecting Tibet and Sinkiang. Initially responsibility for the managing the Sino Indian border was under the Ministry of External Affairs and thereafter under the Home Ministry, a most questionable arrangement as later events were to prove.  Indian Army was handed over the responsibility of the Eastern Theater only in 1959-60 when increasing border incidents went beyond the capability of  Home Ministry and IB police forces to handle. The government of the day declared the launch of the 'Forward Policy' which required Indian Army to establish posts well forward along stated Indian claim lines. The government insisted on implementation of the policy, despite the fact that most of the posts, on account of poor/non existent infrastructure, were logistically unsustainable and exposed to Chinese counter action. The Chinese on the other hand had built up their lines of communication in keeping with their operational plans for application military power. We were majorly lagging in the logistic capability and sustenance loop at the outset of the war. The results of the conflict were a resonance of that neglect.   

The 'Forward Policy' directive was backstopped by Nehru's and IIB's assertion that "the Chinese will not attack", which the army's apex leadership willingly accepted as a truism and proceeded to unquestioningly implement the policy without paying professional heed to the battle indicators which pointed otherwise

It was thus that in September 1962, 7 Infantry brigade of 4 Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier John Dalvi, found itself deployed along the indefensible Namka Chu rivulet, with orders to throw the Chinese off the Thag La ridge. As per India the boundary ran along Thag La ridge. The directive to clear Thag La (Operation Leghorn) had been ordered by the government and accepted by the Army Chief General PN Thapar. Earlier, General Thapar had been appointed as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in 1961 over the head of Lt General SPP Thorat. The outgoing Chief General KS Thimayya had recommended General Thorat for the post of COAS, however Thorat was overlooked in favor of Thapar . It is worth noting that Lt General Thorat as GOC-in-C Eastern Command in 1959 consequent to an operational assessment 'Exercise Lal Quila' had correctly predicted likely Chinese play along our eastern borders and had submitted a counter plan through the then COAS General Thimayya.  The plan was summarily dismissed by Krishna Menon. The other key player of significance was Lt General BM Kaul, an ASC officer and favourite of Nehru. He had earlier been catapulted to the operationaliy vital post of Chief of General Staff (CGS), despite his appointment being opposed by General Thimayya on professional grounds. 

Brigadier John Dalvi was a bright upcoming officer and as a professional he would have well assessed that by being ordered forward to deploy along the Namka Chu, his brigade was in a grievously dangerous and exposed position, given the lack of fire support and almost non existent logistics.  He very well knew that undertaking an offensive against the Chinese under such circumstances would be suicidal. Meanwhile, Kaul had taken over the command of newly raised HQ 4 Corps, responsible for defense of Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA), while Lt General Umrao Singh GOC 33 Corps, who had refused to be a party to the government's forward policy in NEFA, which as per him was militarily unsustainable and dangerous, was shifted to the dormant Sikkim sector and taken out of reckoning. 

Kaul visited 7 Brigade in October and ordered commencement of 'Operation Leghorn' for capture of Thag La ridge from the Chinese. It was at this juncture Dalvi failed his brigade and his country. He had so deployed his brigade that while it met the forward policy requirement of holding the Namka Chu, it was not disposed to undertake a defensive posture and fight a viable battle, leave alone undertake offensive operations.  He could have instead chosen to establish screen positions along the Namka Chu and deploy the major portion of his brigade on the Tsandhar / Hatung La ridge that lay immediately to his rear. This deployment would have enabled 7 Infantry Brigade to give a good account of itself in the coming battle. 

Dalvi failed to give his command a fighting chance. That was his professional and moral failure.

In his book Himalayan Blunder Dalvi writes that he was all along against the directive to deploy along the Namka Chu. If that be so, at this critical juncture what stopped him from taking the right step. At worst he could have asked to be removed from command or as the field commander he could have insisted on not being dictated on how the assigned mission is to be executed. Brigadier Dalvi was a bright officer with an outstanding military record, he possibly was not willing to jeopardize his military career by standing up to General Kaul's flawed directions and thus ended up sacrificing his brigade. On 17th October when the Chinese attacked, the 7 Infantry Brigade was destroyed in a matter of two hours suffering 493 killed. 2 Rajput alone suffered 282 Killed and 80 wounded out of a strength of 513 all ranks.  As a military leader Dalvi failed to do the right thing towards his country and his men. He violated the Chetwodian motto and placed his own good before that of his country and his command. John Dalvi was captured by the Chinese on 18th October and so were the three commanding officers of his brigade.

Major General Niranjan Prasad was GOC 4 Infantry Division. All through this episode he played a dormant role and failed to effectively influence the events as they played out. Professionally he was disagreeing with his Corps Commander General BM Kaul on the way 7 Infantry Brigade was deployed, yet at end of the day he buckled and went along with Kaul. Major General Niranjan Prasad was removed from command after the Namka Chu debacle.  In 1965 however, he was resurrected professionally and handed over command of 15 Infantry Division. He again failed that test during the Indo-Pak 1965 war and for the second time in a row was removed from command in battle. 

Lt General BM Kaul was Nehru's protege. He was an ASC officer with no operational experience and appointed as CGS despite the Chief General Thimayya's opposition.  When Lt General K Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps, the formation responsible for defense of NEFA put his foot down on undertaking the Forward Policy without logistic backup, a new formation 4 Corps was ordered to be raised and Lt General BM Kaul appointed GOC. The inconvenient Lt General Umrao Singh and his 33 Corps were shifted to Sikkim sector which was fairly dormant. This happened in 1962, in the face of a major Chinese build up. 

The issue at hand is not that the events as stated occurred, rather it is more important to examine as to how the office of the COAS and  that of HQ Eastern Command (Lt General LP Sen), went along with these instructions, fully cognizant that we were setting up for a disaster against the Chinese PLAA. It is said that Kaul was looking to be the COAS at a later point in time and for that command of a Corps was an essential pre requisite, while General LP Sen saw himself as the next COAS after Thapar and before Kaul. Hence it appears that their actions were not driven by the Chetwodian motto but rather perversely placed their own good before everything else. Thereby they went along with a  policy of the Government, which they would have realised professionally, was intrinsically flawed. The officers should have put in their resignations rather than be a party to such ventures.

Why did 4 Infantry Division fail in 1962 ? In that era Indian Army was lacking in basic armaments on account of gross neglect by the Government. However it was not an army lacking in experience. Most of the JCOs and Commanding Officers had fought during WW2. Well led, the formation would have given a good account of itself. However the higher military leadership thrown up at that time did not elicit the faith of the rank and file. The war experienced Officers and men of 7 Infantry Brigade would have known that they had been set up by being deployed in a linear fashion along a mountain stream, totally dominated by Chinese forces deployed on the Thag La ridge. They were aware that if the Chinese attacked, the brigade had no fighting chance.  An atmosphere of self before everything else permeated deep in the army mirroring the attitude of the higher military leadership.  It was for that reason that the army failed. There were exceptions, units like 2 Rajput fought to the bitter end. The officers and men of 4 Infantry Division would have known that their corps commander was there to implement his personal agenda and as such was not worthy to be looked up to for leadership in critical situations.

On the other hand in Ladakh sector under the steady hand on Brig TN Raina, 114 Infantry Brigade fought a well planned battle bringing the Chinese offensive to a halt at Chushul. The Western Army Commander Lt General Daulet Singh was proactive in anticipating the impending Chinese offensive and ensured that his formations were prepared to take it on, in stark contrast to Eastern Theatre. 

In the various media articles on this conflict, an oft asked question was can the army fail again. It is a complex issue. In various other professional domains we get to observe failure of leadership and poor moral attitude. These misdemeanors of leadership, though abhorrent, in themselves do not impinge on national security as immensely as would a failure in military leadership. The 1962 debacle was the result of  a self oriented attitude that had grown roots in our army with encouragement from certain government and bureaucratic quarters. In the process merit and competence was given the go-by. Outspoken and competent officers like General Umrao Singh and General Shiv Verma were sidelined. General Thorat as mentioned earlier, was overlooked for the post of COAS.  General Manekshaw too was sidelined and investigated against for being anti-national !

As long as Indian armed forces place merit and quality leadership to be the sole determinants to judge performance and a parameter for selection for higher responsibility, we will continue to throw up top class leadership, that will ensure that the security of the country is strengthened. 

The next conflicts will be hybrid in nature, with no clearly delineated time line of peace and war. It will require top class of military leaders imbued with the spirit of the Chetwodian motto, read the right way.

In recent times, certain negative trends have crept in which require to be arrested. First is the 'mandalisation' of the army with higher rank promotional vacancies based on respective physical strength of various arms and services. This has been the first step towards giving merit the go-by and will have adverse effects and will resonate with time. Mediocrity will threaten to take roots and this has to be guarded against. This 'mandalisation' has triggered a sort of turf war between arms and services to retain or enhance their domains, thereby leading to further dilution of of the time tested principle of merit and setting into motion various plays and manipulations that certainly do not do the army proud, there are adequate articles in the media on such issues. As a first step, the army and the government needs to redefine merit and the understanding of term military leadership and thereafter implement it. General Staff officers must move away from their regimental obsession and their shedding the regimental accoutrements would be a firm step in that direction as has recently been implemented by the government. An army poorly led turns into rabble as what happened in the Eastern sector in 1962, well led, they will do the nation proud.

The Chinaman is a wily adversary. He does not follow the well understood concept of peace and war. For him all time is war time, only the methodology and instruments change. Our armed forces in particular and the nation in general must take a perspective of this emerged threat and prepare to deal with it. The Chinese have shown a propensity of using armed force and to be fair to them they have stated thus clearly in various forums. For example try sending Indian ships into South China sea as the Chinese sent their PLAN submarines to Sri Lanka, and watch their aggressive reaction, thereafter. 

We must shift our focus in a major way eastwards. For example, at least fifty percent NDA cadets must take up Chinese as their foreign language. We need to read what they write, understand what they say and comprehend how they think and react. Presently our knowledge of the Chinese military and their civilizational  attitudes is only peripheral and dependant on western texts and media. There is a need to carry out intensive study of their military norms, practices, tactics and operational strategy to fashion our response. The Chinese army system does not trace its roots to western military traditions. They have their own systems and methodology to which most are unfamiliar. The Japanese were the military Guru's of PLA. It was in the hard fought Sino - Japanese war that PLA and its leadership cut its teeth. The Chinese army adopted some of the best practices of the Japanese army; an orientation towards aggressive maneuver warfare being one of them. This was highlighted in the Korean war where the American army was worsted in the Chosin reservoir battles on the Yalu river and was to be seen again in the rapid advance of the PLA in Tawang and Walong sectors in 1962, completely out maneuvering our forces deployed there.

The Chinaman has his weaknesses too. The Vietnamese analysed them well. In a way the Chinese and Vietnamese have very similar military organisation, battle attitudes and procedures. In the 1979 Sino Vietnam war, the Vietnamese were able to successfully blunt the Chinese offensive inflicting huge casualties in the process. We need to align very closely militarily and politically with Vietnam, there is much to be learned from them. Vietnamese and Japanese would be militarily useful languages that our officers need to learn to help them 'know their adversary' better. It would be a step in the right direction, for the armed forces were to set up a joint operational school, whose sole purpose would be to stare at the Chinaman, decipher him and pass it on to the soldiery, to enable them to prepare better. 

History has lessons for us and we need to take note. The failure of Ibrahim Lodhi and Rana Sangha to take note of the introduction of gunpowder weapons by the Portugese in the 1490s and their likely impact on warfare led to their defeat at Panipat and Khanwa in 1526 and1527 respectively,  leading to the establishment of Mughal rule in India. 

In the recent air show at Zhuhai, China put on show its latest 6th Generation fighter the 'White Emperor' on diplay as also two 5th Generation fighters J20 and J35 which are already in wide spread service with them. They also had on display twelve types of aircraft engines.  On the other hand our own AMCA and Kaveri still struggle on the design board. The unveiling of the Chinese light tank the T15 Black Panther had us stampeding to develop our own. Point is why was the light tank project not undertaken earlier if an operational need was identified for the same. Recent reports in the media indicate that PLAA brigades have been allotted integral UAV companies and by inference we can assume that their divisions would be feilding UAV battalions and higher level capabilities at Corps and Army levels. On the other hand we still appear to be on the starting block in integrating drones in our warfighting as is highlighted by our lack of such systems in the COIN ops that we are fighting in J&K. Our usage is peripheral at the moment as it seems to appear. 

The rapidity with which Chinese PLA imbibes new technology in its operational organisation and functioning is something which we need to observe closely as it will have a major bearing in any future conflict. 

The above pointers are indicative of an imperfect structure of our Military Industrial Complex. The Russians have at the apex level their 'Military Industrial Commission of Russia' directly reporting to the President. The Chinese have a similar body called 'The Equiment Development Department of Chinese Military Commission'. Such concentration of effort brings about efficiency, accountability and focussed development and quick decision making. Our RFP and GSQR driven system is outmoded as it places the developer and the user in us v/s them camps with the bureaucrat playing both ends. Fundamentally it boils down to sound leadership taking sound decisions.

   We cannot afford to be redeployed on the Namka Chu outplayed in the OODA loop.    

We  need to acknowledge ad analyse the failure of our army in 1962. Examine in depth the reasons for the military debacle, imbibe the lessons well so that similar mistakes are not repeated in future. We must analyse in detail the reasons for failure of military leadership, draw the right conclusions and implement them in our leadership training at all levels. High quality military leadership must be defined in unambiguous terms and steps taken to implement it. It will strengthen our forces immensely. 

We must guard against the culture of 'appointees'. We walked that way once, much to our discomfort.

As Carl Von Clausewitz said " Woe to the Government, which relying on halfhearted politics and a shackled military policy meets a foe, who like the untamed mighty forces of nature, knows no law other than his own."

Chinese "SONGs" in Sri Lanka: The Leading Edge of Emerging Chinese Threat in Bay of Bengal

A Chinese Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN) diesel electric SONG Class (SSK) attack submarine docked in Sri Lankan Colombo harbour on 02 November '14, causing much chagrin and alarm to the Indian Government and presumably to the Indian Navy too. This was a third visit by a PLAN submarine to Colombo harbour. Earlier from 7th to 14th September '14 another SONG Class Attack Submarine had docked in  Colombo harbour presumably to pick up logistics while outbound towards Indian Ocean to join PLAN ships conducting anti piracy operations off the Somalian coast. Prior to that a SHANG Class nuclear powered (SSN) attack submarine had ventured in these waters in February 2014 .

After the first visit of the PLAN submarine, India had conveyed its strong displeasure to the Sri Lankan Government on regarding the permission granted to the PLAN submarine to dock in Colombo; obviously it had little effect. And this despite the Sri Lankan  Defense Minister and Naval Chief having been spoken to during their recent visits to India.

China has an active economic, military and technical assistance program with Sri Lanka. It has made substantial investments in upgrading Sri Lankan infrastructure. The important major projects are the Hambantota Development Zone which includes the port, South Asia's largest container terminal and an International airport at cost of US $1 billion and the Colombo container terminal project at cost of US $ 500 million. The Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT)  is owned by 'Chinese Merchant (Holdings) International Ltd' to the tune of 85 percent as would be the  proposed Hambantota Container Terminal. Hambantota and CICT are similar in concept to Gwadar project where again the Chinese have a controlling interest. Both the SONG Class submarines had docked in the terminal owned by the Chinese company, if that be a pointer for things to come in the future. Gwadar too is owned and operated by the Chinese.

Between 2005-2012 China committed US $4.76 billion in aid to Sri Lanka and from 2012-2014 it has committed US $ 2.18 billion, mostly in form of high interest rate loans. In view of economic experts, Sri Lanka is unlikely be able to repay tese loans. Thus, over time Sri Lanka will possibly become a client state of China, somewhat in the same position as Myanmar finds itself today. 
 
Type 093 (SSN) SHANG Class Hunter Killer nuclear powered submarine 7000 tons displacement.

Type 039G SONG Class (SSK) Diesel Electric Submarine. 2800 tons displacement.







YJ 8 Anti Ship Missile. 80 KM range, 165 kg warhead.



The SONG Class Attack Submarine is a potent representative of the submarine fleet of PLAN. 13 SONGs are in service with PLAN and are similar in concept, design and capability to the Indian SINDUGHOSH (KILO) Class Russian submarines.  The SONG class has been succeeded  by the Type 41 YUAN class (SSK) submarines . 13 YUANs are in service with more building. The YUAN is an improved version of the SONG class and comes equipped with an AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which give the YUAN a possible capability of remaining submerged for between 7-15 days at one go. Both class of submarines have an operating range of 8000 KMs at snorkel depth and can dive to a depth of 300 m. They can remain on patrol for 60 days without replenishment and carry a crew of 40 personnel.

The SONG and the YUAN class are equipped with a mix of potent weapon systems which include six 533mm torpedo tubes capable of launching a variety of active and passive homing torpedoes like the YU 4 and YU 6, with ranges varying from 10 to 20 KMs at a speed of 30 to 40 Knots. China has also imported the Russian VA111 Shkval super cavitating torpedo  which has a speed of more than 200 Knots and a range of 15 KMs. At that torpedo speed the target ship or submarine will have inadequate reaction time to take countermeasures. The SSK submarines are also equipped with the YJ 8 anti ship missile which is launched through the torpedo tube. The missile has a range of 80 KMs and is supersonic in its final approach. It carries a 165 Kg warhead. The PLAN SONGs and YUANs can also carry 24 to 36 anti ship naval mines. Modern anti ship mines are complex equipment and their activation can be based on magnetic, acoustic or water displacement signature of target ships and submarines. The mines can be programmed to attack specific ships based on the ship's signature that has been fed into mines microprocessors. Anti ship mines can be laid in peace time. Some types of mines have deployed life of more than 10 years. Overall Naval mines are a good tool to wage psychological warfare and control access to sea lanes. PLAN submarines can also deploy marine commando teams. These teams can be launched while the submarine is submerged to conduct operations on shore and thereafter the team can be recovered with the submarine remaining submerged. China has over 50 conventional diesel electric attack submarines (SSK), five nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and four to five nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), in the three fleets operated by its navy. 

The capability of Chinese submarines can be sensed by the incident when in October 2006, a SONG class submarine surfaced within 9 miles of USS Kitty Hawk, a 80,000 tonne aircraft carrier escorted by over a dozen ships. The fact that the Chinese  submarine could breach the protective layer and surface well within torpedo range sent seismic shock waves within American naval fraternity. Typically US aircraft carriers maintain a 300 KM exclusion zone all around the carrier, hence the enormity of the SONG breaking through can be well appreciated.

Chinese PLAN submarines patrolling in the Indian Ocean are operating as an offensive subset of China's anti access and area denial strategy, besides reiterating their right to operate within international waters up to 12 nautical miles from the coast.  The submarine operations serve to update critical information pertaining maritime and sub surface operating conditions, enable reconnaissance of vital approaches to Indian ports on the Indian West and East coast as also the strategic Andaman and Nicobar Islands. China's has a major disadvantage that its coastline is surrounded by countries that it would consider inimical to its interests.  You have South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Andaman and Nicobar islands which severely restrict its ability to project naval power into the Pacific Ocean or the Indian Ocean. China's critical sea routes pass through the Malacca Straits and are vulnerable to interdiction in times of conflict. That is the fundamental reason for China to put in place the 'String of Pearls ' strategy. It has also adopted an aggressive posture in the South 

China sea where it has ordained a 'nine dash' line which it claims as its own waters and the Paracel and Spratley group of islands located within. The area as delineated by the Nine Dash Line commands the southern SLOCs of China hence is of vital interest to it and which it will try to dominate. Hence we see the repeated clashes of Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysian navies with PLAN ships.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are located at the Western entrance to the Malacca Straits and are vital to China if it is to secure its sea lanes. Till such time India holds the Andaman Islands, threat to china's SLOCs remains high and would be a strong bargaining chip in international relations. China is trying to remedy the situation by adopting multiple measures. It is steadily building up its marine expeditionary capabilities as also its airborne force projection capability. It has raised a 12000 man marine corps grouped in two brigades with another 30000 personnel in reserve. Interestingly, it has based this force in Zhangjiang as part of the South China Sea fleet and not under the East China Sea fleet where it would have proved a threat to Taiwan. Each marine brigade has a battalion of amphibious light tanks, two mechanized infantry battalions, one infantry battalion and integral fire support assets. A formidable force once set ashore. To support this force and to ensure dominance at sea China would be able to field 3-4 aircraft carrier groups and up to 12 large amphibious assault ships by 2022. 

Y 20

PLA also fields the 15th Airborne Corps with three airborne divisions on its ORBAT. Presently its reach is continental for want of suitable heavy lift aircraft, however that is being addressed by developing a heavy lift aircraft the Y 20 which would be operational in five years time and would be able to carry a 55 ton payload 3000 miles. it would be in the same category as the American C 17 Globe-master. 

In sum, come 2020 and thereabouts, there would be a major potential threat to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Consider this scenario, wherein, China accuses India of continued occupation of Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) and as quid pro quo seizes Andaman Islands completely or in part.It thereafter calls for negotiations. How would we react.  The Andamans are 1300 KM from Indian East coast and are a mere 550 KM from Rangoon which in turn will be connected by road and rail to Kunming province in coming times, a distance of 1200 KM. From Kunming to Port Blair the aerial distance is 1700 KM. Once PLAN has acquired 4-5 carriers, it would most likely maintain one battle group in Bay of Bengal, with another in South China Sea backing it up. The moment PLAN aircraft carriers commence deployment West of Malacca Straits, in essence Andaman and Nicobar islands will be cut off from the main land. It is at this juncture that its captive ports and airfield assets at Rangoon, Hambantota, Colombo and Gwadar will serve as bases to enable China to maintain its fleet in Indian Ocean. 

Operating off Hambantota, the PLAN fleet will attempt to ensure that the Indian Western and Eastern fleets are not able to operate in conjunction. It is also at this juncture that the submarine fleet of PLAN with its multifarious capabilities would come into play by denying access to critical areas. The area denial and anti access plan. 

China does not subscribe to accepted International norms. It has shown a tendency of creating its own norms and parameters as would suit it. The unilateral Nine Dash line and its unsubstantiated claim over Arunachal are  good examples. In 1962 the Chinese attack was not a one off affair. They had planned to go to war and were waiting for a suitable opportunity. There is no way that major Chinese infantry forces would have maneuvered over long distances across mountainous terrain without prior recce and preparation.The Cuban crises gave them that window. It was India, functioning in a reactive mode, that failed to read the real politik situation and banked excessively on vague assurances of 'Chinese will not attack', suffering in bargain humiliation in the conflict. To expect USA to step in on our side or for that matter any other country, would be fallacious and self delusional. 

Now is time to get out act together.  As Carl Von Clausewitz said " Woe to the Government, which relying on halfhearted politics and a shackled military policy meets a foe, who like the untamed mighty forces of nature, knows no law other than his own."

Indian Response to Pakistan Cross Border Firing: A Re Look at BSF

The border population of Jammu region stretching from Akhnur to Sambha faced the brunt of cross border firing by Pakistan from 1st to 10th October leading to heavy casualties on the Indian side. Approximately 70000 civil populace was affected, 30000 had to seek shelter in temporary camps, major damage was inflicted by Pakistani firing to private property in border villages on the Indian side. Cattle livestock was killed or injured in hundreds; city dwellers may not be sensitive to the fact that animal livestock are very precious to rural folk and their loss would have inflicted great anguish. The security and well-being of Indian citizens living in border villages was gravely violated. Interestingly while the IB Sector (International Boundary) of J&K stretching from Sambha to Akhnur was subject to fire by Pakistan Rangers, the LOC sector North and South of Pir Panjal lay largely silent and dormant. Everyone a mute witness to the battering that was being inflicted on innocent and helpless civil populace. Media was up and about as usual, BSF actions and retaliatory firing visuals were splashed all over the TV screens, and interviews of affected people were aired by all sundry channels. Finally, on higher instructions Indian artillery commenced engagements across LOC in areas South of Pir Panjal and stretching up to Sialkot sector on Pak border posts and infrastructure. The vehemence and intensity of Indian response was such, that border firing by Pakistan eased off and conciliatory statements were issued by Pak leadership.

The violent Indian response presumably came as a surprise to the Pakistani regime. While cross border firing has eased off for the moment, the pause may just be temporary till the Pakistanis re calibrate their options and resume targeting India in different forms. There is a pressing need therefore, to re-examine the effectiveness of our main border management force the BSF in light of threats likely to emerge.

The initial cadence of the BSF in this engagement was standard pattern retaliatory firing 'bullet for bullet-Bollywood style'. To a trained eye, the TV visuals of BSF in action indicate an inadequately trained force with poor weapon handling procedures. The 81mm mortar, which is a primary tool for retaliatory fire at BSF battalion level, can fire at a sustained rate of 12 rounds per minute out to a range of 5000 m. Effective mortar fire can be devastating. However, the mortar handling of BSF crews showed that they had little clue of mortar fire procedures. Their actions were hesitant and untrained. The weapon emplacements, construction of defences, siting of surveillance devices was ad hoc and not designed to put down sustained accurate destructive fire power and absorb the same as inflicted by the enemy. Their fundamental body language and fitness levels are that of a Police force rather than that of a Para Military force which would expected to be relevant in emergent operational conditions of 21st Century hybrid warfare. As per Wikipedia the BSF is a 2,40,000 man force organized in 187 battalions with more on the way. It has 20 artillery regiments equipped with 105 mm light field gun having an effective range of 17 Km. It has its own air wing with an assortment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft as also a marine wing.

To put it in right perspective, a standard infantry division has nine infantry battalions. A Corps sized formation has three infantry divisions. 187 BSF battalions would imply a force equivalent to 20 infantry divisions and artillery regiments adequate to populate six artillery brigades. We are looking at a force that has almost as many infantry divisions equivalent that Indian Army has on the Western front albeit organized differently. For all that buck spent on the BSF there is no bang. The border populace continues to be hammered. However, on the other hand BSF video on you tube talk of a force carrying out heliborne operations and visuals that could very well be mistaken to be that of Indian Army in various operational conditions. See the video here .

Established in 1965 with significant army contribution, over time BSF has effectively distanced itself operationally and culturally from the Indian Army, while at the same time propagating a view that it is 'the first responder' in conflict situations and its size and equipment indicate that philosophy. So we have an ersatz army in the making. As well equipped as the Indian Army infantry backed up by field artillery but entirely lacking the leadership, training, and battle instinct of a regular army.

There are very few Indian Army ex-servicemen in BSF, both officers and JCOs/Other Ranks. The terms and conditions for ex-servicemen are harsh and humiliating wherein they are absorbed at ranks and grade inferior to that held while serving in the Army. There is no concept of Indian Army personnel going on deputation to BSF. On the other hand, Pakistan Rangers have a parallel induction system of Pakistan Army personnel into their force as also personnel who come on deputation. Commanding officers and key personnel of Pakistan Rangers battalions are from PA as is the DG who is a Major General appointed by GHQ Pakistan Army. Their operational capability is more akin to that of an Assam rifles battalion, which is a PMF under Indian Army.

Every year thousands of highly trained army personnel are retired as the terms and conditions of service in the army are very different from PMFs. Infantrymen, artillery gunners, signalers, engineers; all of who constitute a wealth of trained and skilled military manpower and could be assets to any PMF, are wasted. Half of Indian Army’s highly trained officers are superseded at fifteen years of service for the simple reason that the steep pyramidal structure of the army cannot absorb them. This is in sharp contrast to the service terms of other government services, PMFs included.

The next conflict would be very different from the previous ones. The dividing lines of peacetime and wartime will be diffused and opaque. The gen-next militant will morph into ISIL like clone and will require coordinated efforts of the State to tackle such threats. The Iraqi Army, Kurds and Syrians are having a tough time tackling ISIL. Once the Americans pull out of Afghanistan, the ability of the present Afghan regime and its army to stand up to Pakistan backed Taliban militants remains a question mark, till such time India as a major stake holder steps in along with other countries to shore up the regime. The next wave of militancy will be more virulent, violent and will aim at holding ground. Forces like BSF and CRPF who have been distancing themselves from Indian Army will suffer in combat. The anti-Naxal operations are a pointer, and the professional should pick up the signals.

It is time that Indian Armed forces personnel are integrated into these PMFs particularly the BSF. The DG and commanding officers should be from the armed forces so that the combat and operational capabilities of these forces are brought up to a level that they justify the expenditure that is being incurred on them.

Chinese Aggression in Ladakh and Indian Response

The Sino Russian Ussuri River dispute had a political backdrop, however one of the claims cited by the Chinese, was that during the time of Qing dynasty, their sovereignty  extended to outer Mongolia and parts of Siberia, and that the Russians had usurped Chinese territory at some point of time, when the Chinese were weak.    The conflict escalated into the intermittent ‘Ussuri River clashes’ extending over a period of seven months with neither side backing off. Finally, post talks a mutually acceptable boundary was demarcated in the area in the 1990's.

The Ussuri River incident has pointers for India. The Sino Indian dispute has a political and economic backdrop along with Chinese hegemonic attitude, which is also being displayed in the maritime disputes in South China sea and the Nine Dash Line claim. The Qing dynasty line is being quoted in Chinese writings particularly as pertaining to Arunachal Pradesh. To think, that mere talks and good economic relations will bring about the Chinese to accept our sense of the LAC as the boundary, is far fetched and can have disastrous consequences. We have walked the path of self-delusional thinking and ambiguous decision making in 1962 and it would be foolish to tread that way again.

While there is much talking and writing in the Indian media of our military and logistic capability gap as against the Chinese PLA. The PLA too has to contend with challenges on the Sino Indian border, and these chinks in the armour can be be exploited to our advantage. In the command structure of PLA, Lanzhou Military region is responsible for operations in Ladakh sector stretching up to areas opposite HP. The PLA in Lanzhou MR, comprising of over six divisions’ of various types, is dependent on a single road artery the Kashgar- Aksai Chin highway. The tenuous road runs over numerous mountain ranges and lends itself well to aerial and ground interdiction. Main PLA forces of Lanzhou MR are based in Urumqi and Gansu military districts. With such extended lines of communications, the PLA will have to carry out a major logistic exercise to transport its forces along this highway through Aksai Chin to areas opposite Indian defenses in Ladakh and HP. A travel distance of over 2000 kms.  There also are vulnerabilities in the rail communication system in Xingjian and in the oil and gas supply system. Any disruption will have a causative effect on PLA forces opposite Ladakh sector.

Reports in the media indicate that China has positioned its military elements in Gilgit -Baltistan, to protect its projects in the area. By doing so, it has created a threat perception to our road communications to Ladakh, which pass through Kargil Sector. In Afghanistan, India is undertaking developmental work at considerable expenditure. The Kashgar-Yakhand-Karakoram-Aksai chin highway travels in close proximity to Sino Afghan border. The situation calls for a bold decision of placing Indian boots on ground in Afghanistan. This will serve the twin purpose of neutralizing Pakistan from the North while at the same time provides a counterpoise to PLA presence in Gilgit-Baltistan. It will also give India the capability to interdict by multiple means the Kashgar road or the Karakoram highway.

With our forces operating in Afghanistan, India will gain the initiative of action against militant forces operating out of that area and at the same time create favorable strategic conditions in Sino Indian context in Ladakh area. We should not perpetually be restricted to a reactive mode of strategic situation.

In another vein, Afghanistan cannot be allowed to go the Iraq way. A rapid pullout by American forces from Iraq has destabilized the country to a point that today their army is not able to stand up to ISIL. Similarly, Afghanistan will continue to face a major Taliban threat and so will India from such militants. It would be in our strategic interest to use a combination of hard power and soft power to ensure Afghanistan stays a viable country and at the same time the Taliban elements and their supporters are engaged heavily from a direction that they least expect. This calls for a bold initiative with well-planned application of air and ground forces in conjunction with ISF/US forces. It is time that Indian Armed forces developed viable expeditionary capability so that India can look after its national interests.

A bold General prefers to carry the battle to enemy territory.