On 1st December a CRPF force, while carrying out area sanitising operations in Chintagufa area of Sukma District of Chattisgarh State, was ambushed by Naxals. Two officers and 11 troopers were killed and another 14 injured as per news reports. The operations involved Number 206 and 223 CRPF Battalions supported by CRPF COBRA units and SPOs, all put togather amounting to around 4000 troops. Their objective was to clear certain areas of Sukma distrct. The operation was presumably launched for the reason that a NSA team led by Mr Shyam Sharan was present in Chattisgarh to evaluate the Naxal situation and was scheduled to visit Dantewada and Bastar areas on 1st December. Both areas lie in close proximity to Sukma District. From another media report one can deduce that the operations were led by IG HS Siddhu and so it would have been a big affair.
First contact with Naxals was established at 11.30 AM on 1st December and the CRPF force finally withdrew and returned to their camp at Chintagufa the same day by 9.30 PM, having collected their dead and wounded. Reading between the lines in the news reports, the extrication of casualties had to be led by the IG himself.
Ellamgunda forest, where the contact took place lies 10-12 KMs from the CRPF camp at Chintagufa. The Naxals were reported to be about 400 in number. From the available inputs the following aspects pertaining to the operation can be discerned.
Firstly, the CRPF is not being able to effectively dominate areas beyond the immediate vicinity of their camp such that almost 400 Naxals were operating within 10 KMs of their camp and had also mined the area with IEDs. This indicates inadequate patrolling and area domination. It appears that CRPF is largely restricted to their camps.
Secondly, the night lies with the Naxal. Having established contact with a 400 strong Naxal force at 11.30 AM, the brigade sized CRPF force should have persisted with the contact and developed the operation to inflict heavy casualties to the Naxals, capture prisoners and at end of the day, retain possession of the battle ground. In conventional terms such an operation would have lasted about 72 - 96 hours. However, we find that the CRPF force withdrew to their camp with great difficulty by 9.30 PM after extricating their casualties. It is obvious that the CRPF was not willing to persist with anti Naxal operations at night.
This is a serious matter. This is possibly the first time that the Naxals have taken to give conventional battle to a major CPO force, inflict serious casualties on them and thereafter force them into a withdrawal. The CRPF brigade sized force was handed a severe setback in battle. The term battle is used with deliberation. The CRPF and Naxals have for the first time fought a deliberate battle, where the CRPF would have had to conduct offensive manoeuvre operations to clear the Naxals and were bettered by the Naxals. So it seems the Naxal movement has moved on to the next level of communist guerrilla warfare, that is, from hit and run raids and ambushes to deliberate operations against government forces. We will increasingly see this trend manifesting itself and it calls for some serious recalibration of government forces response.
Thirdly, there are reports that the IAF helicopters were not used for casualty evacuation. However, from media reports it can be made out that till as late as 5 PM in the evening the casualties had not been extricated from the area of contact. It appears that the IG himself had to lead a force to pull out the casualties. This does not speak well for the battalions in contact that they were unable to pull out their own casualties. There appear to be serious issue of lack of morale, motivation and battle attitude in CPOs. Obviously, at this late hour helicopters would have been unable to undertake a mission over uncleared areas despite the fact that the Mi 17 1V's have night flying capability.
An objective analysis of this CRPF operation and the performance of BSF in tackling border violations as discussed in my earlier post, indicates that the CPOs are gravely lacking in capability to participate in hybrid operations that will be the norm in the coming times. The nature of hybrid warfare would require that the forces have capability akin to light infantry with the battle attitude of closing and destroying the adversary. The attitude is missing and is reflected in the precipitate withdrawal of an IG led CRPF force of around 4000 all ranks, to the safety of their camp. Recently four Pak terrorists broke through BSF manned border fence in Samba area. The BSF called in the army rather than take on the terrorists themselves. The BSF is a 187 battalion force, whereas CRPF is a 232 battalion force as per wikipedia. Together they constitute a force equivalent of approximately 46 infantry divisions. Forces of immense numbers, as big if not bigger than Indian Army, equipped in a similar manner as regular infantry of Indian Army with same rifles, LMGs, MMGs, Rocket launchers, motors, NVDs, BFSRs and et al that goes with an infantry unit. However they are observed to be entirely lacking in a viable operational capability that would enable them to handle home grown threats like the Naxals, the to be expected ISIS clones or cross border Afgan/ Pak militants, who could be expected in larger numbers once the US forces in Afghanistan draw down. In all such conditions there will be pressure to call in Indian Army.
The CPOs lack battle spirit. Over time they have drifted away from the army ethos and have increasingly adopted a police like ethos. They have no space for personnel from the Indian Army within their organisation which logically should have been the case. There is a pressing requirement to take a re look at our homeland security organisation. The immense expenditure being incurred on CPOs is bearing little fruit. It is time that that the government set up an inter disciplinary team to arrive at emerging nature of threats and the organisation of forces to deal with them.
First contact with Naxals was established at 11.30 AM on 1st December and the CRPF force finally withdrew and returned to their camp at Chintagufa the same day by 9.30 PM, having collected their dead and wounded. Reading between the lines in the news reports, the extrication of casualties had to be led by the IG himself.
Ellamgunda forest, where the contact took place lies 10-12 KMs from the CRPF camp at Chintagufa. The Naxals were reported to be about 400 in number. From the available inputs the following aspects pertaining to the operation can be discerned.
Firstly, the CRPF is not being able to effectively dominate areas beyond the immediate vicinity of their camp such that almost 400 Naxals were operating within 10 KMs of their camp and had also mined the area with IEDs. This indicates inadequate patrolling and area domination. It appears that CRPF is largely restricted to their camps.
Secondly, the night lies with the Naxal. Having established contact with a 400 strong Naxal force at 11.30 AM, the brigade sized CRPF force should have persisted with the contact and developed the operation to inflict heavy casualties to the Naxals, capture prisoners and at end of the day, retain possession of the battle ground. In conventional terms such an operation would have lasted about 72 - 96 hours. However, we find that the CRPF force withdrew to their camp with great difficulty by 9.30 PM after extricating their casualties. It is obvious that the CRPF was not willing to persist with anti Naxal operations at night.
This is a serious matter. This is possibly the first time that the Naxals have taken to give conventional battle to a major CPO force, inflict serious casualties on them and thereafter force them into a withdrawal. The CRPF brigade sized force was handed a severe setback in battle. The term battle is used with deliberation. The CRPF and Naxals have for the first time fought a deliberate battle, where the CRPF would have had to conduct offensive manoeuvre operations to clear the Naxals and were bettered by the Naxals. So it seems the Naxal movement has moved on to the next level of communist guerrilla warfare, that is, from hit and run raids and ambushes to deliberate operations against government forces. We will increasingly see this trend manifesting itself and it calls for some serious recalibration of government forces response.
Thirdly, there are reports that the IAF helicopters were not used for casualty evacuation. However, from media reports it can be made out that till as late as 5 PM in the evening the casualties had not been extricated from the area of contact. It appears that the IG himself had to lead a force to pull out the casualties. This does not speak well for the battalions in contact that they were unable to pull out their own casualties. There appear to be serious issue of lack of morale, motivation and battle attitude in CPOs. Obviously, at this late hour helicopters would have been unable to undertake a mission over uncleared areas despite the fact that the Mi 17 1V's have night flying capability.
An objective analysis of this CRPF operation and the performance of BSF in tackling border violations as discussed in my earlier post, indicates that the CPOs are gravely lacking in capability to participate in hybrid operations that will be the norm in the coming times. The nature of hybrid warfare would require that the forces have capability akin to light infantry with the battle attitude of closing and destroying the adversary. The attitude is missing and is reflected in the precipitate withdrawal of an IG led CRPF force of around 4000 all ranks, to the safety of their camp. Recently four Pak terrorists broke through BSF manned border fence in Samba area. The BSF called in the army rather than take on the terrorists themselves. The BSF is a 187 battalion force, whereas CRPF is a 232 battalion force as per wikipedia. Together they constitute a force equivalent of approximately 46 infantry divisions. Forces of immense numbers, as big if not bigger than Indian Army, equipped in a similar manner as regular infantry of Indian Army with same rifles, LMGs, MMGs, Rocket launchers, motors, NVDs, BFSRs and et al that goes with an infantry unit. However they are observed to be entirely lacking in a viable operational capability that would enable them to handle home grown threats like the Naxals, the to be expected ISIS clones or cross border Afgan/ Pak militants, who could be expected in larger numbers once the US forces in Afghanistan draw down. In all such conditions there will be pressure to call in Indian Army.
The CPOs lack battle spirit. Over time they have drifted away from the army ethos and have increasingly adopted a police like ethos. They have no space for personnel from the Indian Army within their organisation which logically should have been the case. There is a pressing requirement to take a re look at our homeland security organisation. The immense expenditure being incurred on CPOs is bearing little fruit. It is time that that the government set up an inter disciplinary team to arrive at emerging nature of threats and the organisation of forces to deal with them.
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