The
Sino Russian Ussuri River dispute had a political backdrop, however one of the claims cited by the Chinese, was that during the time of Qing dynasty, their sovereignty extended to outer Mongolia and parts of
Siberia, and that the Russians had usurped Chinese territory at some point of
time, when the Chinese were weak. The conflict escalated into the intermittent
‘Ussuri River clashes’ extending over a period of seven months with neither side
backing off. Finally, post talks a mutually acceptable boundary was demarcated in the
area in the 1990's.
The Ussuri River
incident has pointers for India. The Sino Indian dispute has a political and
economic backdrop along with Chinese hegemonic attitude, which is also being
displayed in the maritime disputes in South China sea and the Nine Dash Line
claim. The Qing dynasty line is being quoted in Chinese writings particularly as
pertaining to Arunachal Pradesh. To think, that mere talks and good economic
relations will bring about the Chinese to accept our sense of the LAC as the
boundary, is far fetched and can have disastrous consequences. We have walked
the path of self-delusional thinking and ambiguous decision making in 1962 and
it would be foolish to tread that way again.
While there is
much talking and writing in the Indian media of our military and logistic
capability gap as against the Chinese PLA. The PLA too has to contend with
challenges on the Sino Indian border, and these chinks in the armour can be be
exploited to our advantage. In the command structure of PLA, Lanzhou Military
region is responsible for operations in Ladakh sector stretching up to areas
opposite HP. The PLA in Lanzhou MR, comprising of over six divisions’ of various
types, is dependent on a single road artery the Kashgar- Aksai Chin highway. The
tenuous road runs over numerous mountain ranges and lends itself well to aerial
and ground interdiction. Main PLA forces of Lanzhou MR are based in Urumqi and Gansu
military districts. With such extended lines of communications, the PLA will
have to carry out a major logistic exercise to transport its forces along this highway
through Aksai Chin to areas opposite Indian defenses in Ladakh and HP. A travel
distance of over 2000 kms. There also are
vulnerabilities in the rail communication system in Xingjian and in the oil and
gas supply system. Any disruption will have a causative effect on PLA forces
opposite Ladakh sector.
Reports in the
media indicate that China has positioned its military elements in Gilgit -Baltistan, to protect its projects in the area. By doing so, it has created a
threat perception to our road communications to Ladakh, which pass through Kargil
Sector. In Afghanistan, India is undertaking developmental work at considerable
expenditure. The Kashgar-Yakhand-Karakoram-Aksai chin highway travels in close
proximity to Sino Afghan border. The situation calls for a bold decision of
placing Indian boots on ground in Afghanistan. This will serve the twin purpose
of neutralizing Pakistan from the North while at the same time provides a
counterpoise to PLA presence in Gilgit-Baltistan. It will also give India the capability
to interdict by multiple means the Kashgar road or the Karakoram highway.
With our forces operating
in Afghanistan, India will gain the initiative of action against militant
forces operating out of that area and at the same time create favorable strategic
conditions in Sino Indian context in Ladakh area. We should not perpetually be
restricted to a reactive mode of strategic situation.
In another vein,
Afghanistan cannot be allowed to go the Iraq way. A rapid pullout by American
forces from Iraq has destabilized the country to a point that today their army
is not able to stand up to ISIL. Similarly, Afghanistan will continue to face a
major Taliban threat and so will India from such militants. It would be in our
strategic interest to use a combination of hard power and soft power to ensure Afghanistan
stays a viable country and at the same time the Taliban elements and their
supporters are engaged heavily from a direction that they least expect. This
calls for a bold initiative with well-planned application of air and ground forces
in conjunction with ISF/US forces. It is time that Indian Armed forces
developed viable expeditionary capability so that India can look after its
national interests.
A bold General
prefers to carry the battle to enemy territory.
