The CRPF - Naxal Battle at Sukma, Chattisgarh

On 1st December a CRPF force, while carrying out area sanitising operations in Chintagufa area of Sukma District of Chattisgarh State, was ambushed by Naxals. Two officers and 11 troopers were killed and another 14 injured as per news reports. The operations involved Number 206 and 223 CRPF Battalions supported by CRPF COBRA units and SPOs, all put togather amounting to around 4000 troops. Their objective was to clear certain areas of Sukma distrct. The operation was presumably launched for the reason that a NSA team led by Mr Shyam Sharan was present in Chattisgarh to evaluate the Naxal situation and was scheduled to visit Dantewada and Bastar areas on 1st December. Both areas lie in close proximity to Sukma District.  From another media report one can deduce that the operations were led by IG HS Siddhu and so it would have been a big affair.

First contact with Naxals was established at 11.30 AM  on 1st December and the CRPF force finally withdrew and returned to their camp at Chintagufa the same day by 9.30 PM, having collected their dead and wounded. Reading between the lines in the news reports, the extrication of casualties had to be led by the IG himself.

Ellamgunda forest, where the contact took place lies 10-12 KMs from the CRPF camp at Chintagufa. The Naxals were reported to be about 400 in number. From the available inputs the following aspects pertaining to the operation can be discerned.

Firstly, the CRPF is not being able to effectively dominate areas beyond the immediate vicinity of their camp such that almost 400 Naxals were operating within 10 KMs of their camp and had also mined the area with IEDs. This indicates inadequate patrolling and area domination. It appears that CRPF is largely restricted to their camps.

Secondly, the night lies with the Naxal. Having established contact with a 400 strong Naxal force at 11.30 AM, the brigade sized CRPF force should have persisted with the contact and developed the operation to inflict heavy casualties to the Naxals, capture prisoners and at end of the day, retain possession of the battle ground.  In conventional terms such an operation would have lasted about 72 - 96 hours. However, we find that the CRPF force withdrew to their camp with great difficulty by 9.30 PM after extricating their casualties. It is obvious that the CRPF was not willing to persist with anti Naxal operations at night.

This is a serious matter. This is possibly the first time that the Naxals have taken to give conventional battle to a major CPO force, inflict serious casualties on them and thereafter force them into a withdrawal. The CRPF brigade sized force was handed a severe setback in battle. The term battle is used with deliberation. The CRPF and Naxals have for the first time fought a deliberate battle, where the CRPF would have had to conduct offensive manoeuvre operations to clear the Naxals and were bettered by the Naxals. So it seems the Naxal movement has moved on to the next level of communist guerrilla warfare, that is, from hit and run raids and ambushes to deliberate operations against government forces. We will increasingly see this trend manifesting itself and it calls for some serious recalibration of government forces response.

Thirdly, there are reports that the IAF helicopters were not used for casualty evacuation. However, from media reports it can be made out that till as late as 5 PM in the evening the casualties had not been extricated from the area of contact. It appears that the IG himself had to lead a force to pull out the casualties. This does not speak well for the battalions in contact that they were unable to pull out their own casualties. There appear to be serious issue of lack of morale, motivation and battle attitude in CPOs. Obviously, at this late hour helicopters would have been unable to undertake a mission over uncleared areas despite the fact that the Mi 17 1V's have night flying capability.

An objective analysis of this CRPF operation and the performance of BSF in tackling border violations as discussed in my earlier post, indicates that the CPOs are gravely lacking in capability to participate in hybrid operations that will be the norm in the coming times. The nature of hybrid warfare would require that the forces have capability akin to light infantry with the battle attitude of closing and destroying the adversary. The attitude is missing and is reflected in the precipitate withdrawal of an IG led CRPF force of around 4000 all ranks, to the safety of their camp. Recently four Pak terrorists broke through BSF manned border fence in Samba area. The BSF called in the army rather than take on the terrorists themselves. The BSF is a 187 battalion force, whereas CRPF is a 232 battalion force as per wikipedia. Together they constitute a force equivalent of approximately 46 infantry divisions. Forces of immense numbers, as big if not bigger than Indian Army, equipped in a similar manner as regular infantry of Indian Army with same rifles, LMGs, MMGs, Rocket launchers, motors, NVDs, BFSRs and et al that goes with an infantry unit. However they are observed to be entirely lacking in a viable operational capability that would enable them to handle home grown threats like the Naxals, the to be expected ISIS clones or cross border Afgan/ Pak militants, who could be expected in larger numbers once the US forces in Afghanistan draw down. In all such conditions there will be pressure to call in Indian Army.

The CPOs lack battle spirit. Over time they have drifted away from the army ethos and have increasingly adopted a police like ethos. They have no space for personnel from the Indian Army within their organisation which logically should have been the case. There is a pressing requirement to take a re look at our homeland security organisation. The immense expenditure being incurred on CPOs is bearing little fruit. It is time that that the government set up an inter disciplinary team to arrive at emerging nature of threats and the organisation of forces to deal with them.


 

 

Indian Response to Pakistan Cross Border Firing: A Re Look at BSF

The border population of Jammu region stretching from Akhnur to Sambha faced the brunt of cross border firing by Pakistan from 1st to 10th October leading to heavy casualties on the Indian side. Approximately 70000 civil populace was affected, 30000 had to seek shelter in temporary camps, major damage was inflicted by Pakistani firing to private property in border villages on the Indian side. Cattle livestock was killed or injured in hundreds; city dwellers may not be sensitive to the fact that animal livestock are very precious to rural folk and their loss would have inflicted great anguish. The security and well-being of Indian citizens living in border villages was gravely violated. Interestingly while the IB Sector (International Boundary) of J&K stretching from Sambha to Akhnur was subject to fire by Pakistan Rangers, the LOC sector North and South of Pir Panjal lay largely silent and dormant. Everyone a mute witness to the battering that was being inflicted on innocent and helpless civil populace. Media was up and about as usual, BSF actions and retaliatory firing visuals were splashed all over the TV screens, and interviews of affected people were aired by all sundry channels. Finally, on higher instructions Indian artillery commenced engagements across LOC in areas South of Pir Panjal and stretching up to Sialkot sector on Pak border posts and infrastructure. The vehemence and intensity of Indian response was such, that border firing by Pakistan eased off and conciliatory statements were issued by Pak leadership.

The violent Indian response presumably came as a surprise to the Pakistani regime. While cross border firing has eased off for the moment, the pause may just be temporary till the Pakistanis re calibrate their options and resume targeting India in different forms. There is a pressing need therefore, to re-examine the effectiveness of our main border management force the BSF in light of threats likely to emerge.

The initial cadence of the BSF in this engagement was standard pattern retaliatory firing 'bullet for bullet-Bollywood style'. To a trained eye, the TV visuals of BSF in action indicate an inadequately trained force with poor weapon handling procedures. The 81mm mortar, which is a primary tool for retaliatory fire at BSF battalion level, can fire at a sustained rate of 12 rounds per minute out to a range of 5000 m. Effective mortar fire can be devastating. However, the mortar handling of BSF crews showed that they had little clue of mortar fire procedures. Their actions were hesitant and untrained. The weapon emplacements, construction of defences, siting of surveillance devices was ad hoc and not designed to put down sustained accurate destructive fire power and absorb the same as inflicted by the enemy. Their fundamental body language and fitness levels are that of a Police force rather than that of a Para Military force which would expected to be relevant in emergent operational conditions of 21st Century hybrid warfare. As per Wikipedia the BSF is a 2,40,000 man force organized in 187 battalions with more on the way. It has 20 artillery regiments equipped with 105 mm light field gun having an effective range of 17 Km. It has its own air wing with an assortment of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft as also a marine wing.

To put it in right perspective, a standard infantry division has nine infantry battalions. A Corps sized formation has three infantry divisions. 187 BSF battalions would imply a force equivalent to 20 infantry divisions and artillery regiments adequate to populate six artillery brigades. We are looking at a force that has almost as many infantry divisions equivalent that Indian Army has on the Western front albeit organized differently. For all that buck spent on the BSF there is no bang. The border populace continues to be hammered. However, on the other hand BSF video on you tube talk of a force carrying out heliborne operations and visuals that could very well be mistaken to be that of Indian Army in various operational conditions. See the video here .

Established in 1965 with significant army contribution, over time BSF has effectively distanced itself operationally and culturally from the Indian Army, while at the same time propagating a view that it is 'the first responder' in conflict situations and its size and equipment indicate that philosophy. So we have an ersatz army in the making. As well equipped as the Indian Army infantry backed up by field artillery but entirely lacking the leadership, training, and battle instinct of a regular army.

There are very few Indian Army ex-servicemen in BSF, both officers and JCOs/Other Ranks. The terms and conditions for ex-servicemen are harsh and humiliating wherein they are absorbed at ranks and grade inferior to that held while serving in the Army. There is no concept of Indian Army personnel going on deputation to BSF. On the other hand, Pakistan Rangers have a parallel induction system of Pakistan Army personnel into their force as also personnel who come on deputation. Commanding officers and key personnel of Pakistan Rangers battalions are from PA as is the DG who is a Major General appointed by GHQ Pakistan Army. Their operational capability is more akin to that of an Assam rifles battalion, which is a PMF under Indian Army.

Every year thousands of highly trained army personnel are retired as the terms and conditions of service in the army are very different from PMFs. Infantrymen, artillery gunners, signalers, engineers; all of who constitute a wealth of trained and skilled military manpower and could be assets to any PMF, are wasted. Half of Indian Army’s highly trained officers are superseded at fifteen years of service for the simple reason that the steep pyramidal structure of the army cannot absorb them. This is in sharp contrast to the service terms of other government services, PMFs included.

The next conflict would be very different from the previous ones. The dividing lines of peacetime and wartime will be diffused and opaque. The gen-next militant will morph into ISIL like clone and will require coordinated efforts of the State to tackle such threats. The Iraqi Army, Kurds and Syrians are having a tough time tackling ISIL. Once the Americans pull out of Afghanistan, the ability of the present Afghan regime and its army to stand up to Pakistan backed Taliban militants remains a question mark, till such time India as a major stake holder steps in along with other countries to shore up the regime. The next wave of militancy will be more virulent, violent and will aim at holding ground. Forces like BSF and CRPF who have been distancing themselves from Indian Army will suffer in combat. The anti-Naxal operations are a pointer, and the professional should pick up the signals.

It is time that Indian Armed forces personnel are integrated into these PMFs particularly the BSF. The DG and commanding officers should be from the armed forces so that the combat and operational capabilities of these forces are brought up to a level that they justify the expenditure that is being incurred on them.