A Chinese Peoples Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN) diesel electric SONG Class (SSK) attack submarine docked in Sri Lankan Colombo harbour on 02 November '14, causing much chagrin and alarm to the Indian Government and presumably to the Indian Navy too. This was a third visit by a PLAN submarine to Colombo harbour. Earlier from 7th to 14th September '14 another SONG Class Attack Submarine had docked in Colombo harbour presumably to pick up logistics while outbound towards Indian Ocean to join PLAN ships conducting anti piracy operations off the Somalian coast. Prior to that a SHANG Class nuclear powered (SSN) attack submarine had ventured in these waters in February 2014 .
After the first visit of the PLAN submarine, India had conveyed its strong displeasure to the Sri Lankan Government on regarding the permission granted to the PLAN submarine to dock in Colombo; obviously it had little effect. And this despite the Sri Lankan Defense Minister and Naval Chief having been spoken to during their recent visits to India.
China has an active economic, military and technical assistance program with Sri Lanka. It has made substantial investments in upgrading Sri Lankan infrastructure. The important major projects are the Hambantota Development Zone which includes the port, South Asia's largest container terminal and an International airport at cost of US $1 billion and the Colombo container terminal project at cost of US $ 500 million. The Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) is owned by 'Chinese Merchant (Holdings) International Ltd' to the tune of 85 percent as would be the proposed Hambantota Container Terminal. Hambantota and CICT are similar in concept to Gwadar project where again the Chinese have a controlling interest. Both the SONG Class submarines had docked in the terminal owned by the Chinese company, if that be a pointer for things to come in the future. Gwadar too is owned and operated by the Chinese.
Between 2005-2012 China committed US $4.76 billion in aid to Sri Lanka and from 2012-2014 it has committed US $ 2.18 billion, mostly in form of high interest rate loans. In view of economic experts, Sri Lanka is unlikely be able to repay tese loans. Thus, over time Sri Lanka will possibly become a client state of China, somewhat in the same position as Myanmar finds itself today.
Type 093 (SSN) SHANG Class Hunter Killer nuclear powered submarine 7000 tons displacement.
Type 039G SONG Class (SSK) Diesel Electric Submarine. 2800 tons displacement.
YJ 8 Anti Ship Missile. 80 KM range, 165 kg warhead.
The SONG Class Attack Submarine is a potent representative of the submarine fleet of PLAN. 13 SONGs are in service with PLAN and are similar in concept, design and capability to the Indian SINDUGHOSH (KILO) Class Russian submarines. The SONG class has been succeeded by the Type 41 YUAN class (SSK) submarines . 13 YUANs are in service with more building. The YUAN is an improved version of the SONG class and comes equipped with an AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system, which give the YUAN a possible capability of remaining submerged for between 7-15 days at one go. Both class of submarines have an operating range of 8000 KMs at snorkel depth and can dive to a depth of 300 m. They can remain on patrol for 60 days without replenishment and carry a crew of 40 personnel.
The SONG and the YUAN class are equipped with a mix of potent weapon systems which include six 533mm torpedo tubes capable of launching a variety of active and passive homing torpedoes like the YU 4 and YU 6, with ranges varying from 10 to 20 KMs at a speed of 30 to 40 Knots. China has also imported the Russian VA111 Shkval super cavitating torpedo which has a speed of more than 200 Knots and a range of 15 KMs. At that torpedo speed the target ship or submarine will have inadequate reaction time to take countermeasures. The SSK submarines are also equipped with the YJ 8 anti ship missile which is launched through the torpedo tube. The missile has a range of 80 KMs and is supersonic in its final approach. It carries a 165 Kg warhead. The PLAN SONGs and YUANs can also carry 24 to 36 anti ship naval mines. Modern anti ship mines are complex equipment and their activation can be based on magnetic, acoustic or water displacement signature of target ships and submarines. The mines can be programmed to attack specific ships based on the ship's signature that has been fed into mines microprocessors. Anti ship mines can be laid in peace time. Some types of mines have deployed life of more than 10 years. Overall Naval mines are a good tool to wage psychological warfare and control access to sea lanes. PLAN submarines can also deploy marine commando teams. These teams can be launched while the submarine is submerged to conduct operations on shore and thereafter the team can be recovered with the submarine remaining submerged. China has over 50 conventional diesel electric attack submarines (SSK), five nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) and four to five nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), in the three fleets operated by its navy.
The capability of Chinese submarines can be sensed by the incident when in October 2006, a SONG class submarine surfaced within 9 miles of USS Kitty Hawk, a 80,000 tonne aircraft carrier escorted by over a dozen ships. The fact that the Chinese submarine could breach the protective layer and surface well within torpedo range sent seismic shock waves within American naval fraternity. Typically US aircraft carriers maintain a 300 KM exclusion zone all around the carrier, hence the enormity of the SONG breaking through can be well appreciated.
Chinese PLAN submarines patrolling in the Indian Ocean are operating as an offensive subset of China's anti access and area denial strategy, besides reiterating their right to operate within international waters up to 12 nautical miles from the coast. The submarine operations serve to update critical information pertaining maritime and sub surface operating conditions, enable reconnaissance of vital approaches to Indian ports on the Indian West and East coast as also the strategic Andaman and Nicobar Islands. China's has a major disadvantage that its coastline is surrounded by countries that it would consider inimical to its interests. You have South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Andaman and Nicobar islands which severely restrict its ability to project naval power into the Pacific Ocean or the Indian Ocean. China's critical sea routes pass through the Malacca Straits and are vulnerable to interdiction in times of conflict. That is the fundamental reason for China to put in place the 'String of Pearls ' strategy. It has also adopted an aggressive posture in the South
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are located at the Western entrance to the Malacca Straits and are vital to China if it is to secure its sea lanes. Till such time India holds the Andaman Islands, threat to china's SLOCs remains high and would be a strong bargaining chip in international relations. China is trying to remedy the situation by adopting multiple measures. It is steadily building up its marine expeditionary capabilities as also its airborne force projection capability. It has raised a 12000 man marine corps grouped in two brigades with another 30000 personnel in reserve. Interestingly, it has based this force in Zhangjiang as part of the South China Sea fleet and not under the East China Sea fleet where it would have proved a threat to Taiwan. Each marine brigade has a battalion of amphibious light tanks, two mechanized infantry battalions, one infantry battalion and integral fire support assets. A formidable force once set ashore. To support this force and to ensure dominance at sea China would be able to field 3-4 aircraft carrier groups and up to 12 large amphibious assault ships by 2022.
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| Y 20 |
PLA also fields the 15th Airborne Corps with three airborne divisions on its ORBAT. Presently its reach is continental for want of suitable heavy lift aircraft, however that is being addressed by developing a heavy lift aircraft the Y 20 which would be operational in five years time and would be able to carry a 55 ton payload 3000 miles. it would be in the same category as the American C 17 Globe-master.
In sum, come 2020 and thereabouts, there would be a major potential threat to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Consider this scenario, wherein, China accuses India of continued occupation of Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) and as quid pro quo seizes Andaman Islands completely or in part.It thereafter calls for negotiations. How would we react. The Andamans are 1300 KM from Indian East coast and are a mere 550 KM from Rangoon which in turn will be connected by road and rail to Kunming province in coming times, a distance of 1200 KM. From Kunming to Port Blair the aerial distance is 1700 KM. Once PLAN has acquired 4-5 carriers, it would most likely maintain one battle group in Bay of Bengal, with another in South China Sea backing it up. The moment PLAN aircraft carriers commence deployment West of Malacca Straits, in essence Andaman and Nicobar islands will be cut off from the main land. It is at this juncture that its captive ports and airfield assets at Rangoon, Hambantota, Colombo and Gwadar will serve as bases to enable China to maintain its fleet in Indian Ocean.
Operating off Hambantota, the PLAN fleet will attempt to ensure that the Indian Western and Eastern fleets are not able to operate in conjunction. It is also at this juncture that the submarine fleet of PLAN with its multifarious capabilities would come into play by denying access to critical areas. The area denial and anti access plan.
China does not subscribe to accepted International norms. It has shown a tendency of creating its own norms and parameters as would suit it. The unilateral Nine Dash line and its unsubstantiated claim over Arunachal are good examples. In 1962 the Chinese attack was not a one off affair. They had planned to go to war and were waiting for a suitable opportunity. There is no way that major Chinese infantry forces would have maneuvered over long distances across mountainous terrain without prior recce and preparation.The Cuban crises gave them that window. It was India, functioning in a reactive mode, that failed to read the real politik situation and banked excessively on vague assurances of 'Chinese will not attack', suffering in bargain humiliation in the conflict. To expect USA to step in on our side or for that matter any other country, would be fallacious and self delusional.
Now is time to get out act together. As Carl Von Clausewitz said " Woe to the Government, which relying on halfhearted politics and a shackled military policy meets a foe, who like the untamed mighty forces of nature, knows no law other than his own."
