Nishant UAV Imbroglio

With the crash of the fourth and last Nishant UAV held by the army, earlier this month, the army called it a day and informed DRDO that it would not be acquiring any more Nishants from them and that they may like to shut down the project.

DRDO made Nishant UAV is a catapult launched tactical aerial surveillance system. Visualised and designed in the 1990s, it was inducted last year finally after interminable trials.  Indian Army opted to buy four Nishants and associated support systems. However, as the story unfolded, within an year of induction all four UAVs had crashed and now the army has informed DRDO, that they could scupper the program as no more Nishants would be ordered. It took DRDO 25 years and over 100 crores to operationalise four UAVs and have them all crash within an year of induction. The Nishant crashes are symptomatic of deep underlying malaise that has seeped into the very bones of DRDO and the services as far as production of indigenous defence systems are concerned. Till these deficiencies are addressed the sorry saga will re run time and again.

The slow grinding pace of DRDO is incomprehensible and unforgivable. The armed forces too are jointly responsible for this sad state of affairs and all these organisations need to pull redefine the manner in which they interact with each other.

The Nishant was designed based on an army QR. Air force took no interest in it. This was a fundamental error. Air Force had institutional knowledge of flying systems, also the UAV was being designed as a tactical UAV with a 150 km range, was very much in the close air support and battle field interdiction domain of the air force. The air force should have been part of the project from the start. It is inexcusable.

The DRDO, having obtained its QR (and more importantly the funding), feathered this nest so the project can last ad infinitum. Observe, DRDO brings few projects to effective operational conclusion. They do not involve any army or airforce experts in the design and trail phase. Notional army representation in the project is for administration and routine staff work with service HQs. The army and airforce, on the other hand, have no institution which they can throw up trained and aware officers and men who can meaningfully contribute to development of new defence systems. The Navy has such a cadre in shape of 'ship constructors' who contribute in a major manner to the conceptualisation of ship design and work in close coordination with Shipyards and DRDO. So note the success of naval warship construction. One nuclear submarine, the apex predator, is under trials and a handful more are under construction. As far as surface combatants is concerned we are self sufficient. An excellent state.

The other two services have nothing to show. The fault lies not with the people, but rather in the existing organisation and attitude. This compartmentalisation has to be ruthlessly broken up.

So coming back to Nishant. It is the heaviest catapult launched UAV in the world. At 350 kg weight, it requires a massive 14 ton pneumatic catapult system to throw it in the air. They could have chosen JATO packs for the purpose, however its capability to launch a heavy body in such short distance remains a question mark. Now most of other catapult launched systems are comparatively light weight, their parachute recovery is a simpler affair. Not so in the case of Nishant. At 350 kg it required a larger parachute system, had higher ground impact, hence  needed stronger construction (more weight) and suffered more damage on recovery. See how a fundamental error in design has a cascading effect. It could have been avoided if there was a clear appreciation of present and future operating conditions and if there was a cadre of personnel who were trained to think in such a manner.

The launch limitations of the Nishant had other downsides too. There would be a restriction on its payload as there is only that much weight that you can throw up using a catapult. So it had limited fuel (range), limited capability to carry optronic packages, thus defeating the very purpose of its existence.  No doubt the army was against inducting such a lemon system.

The catapult launch system offers some major advantages, the chief one being, the flexibility of launching from anywhere and recovery without need of extensive ground infrastructure like runway etc. Large number of tactical UAVs use catapult launch as a preferred mode. However in its 25 year of existence the launch and recovery system of Nishant does not seem to have been improved upon or recourse made to newer technologies.   DRDO as much to answer for. What it successfully achieved was to keep the services out of the developmental cycle, to the detriment of system capability. Not that the services were overly keen to get involved as long as they could import systems.

Incidentally lack of suitable tactical surveillance systems with day night capability is translating into physical casualties to our troops as they operate with inadequate situational awareness due to lack of real time information, for which UAV is a preferred tool. There has to be accountability. we recently lost a second colonel this year.

The way forward is not to dunk the Nishant system as the army has deigned, but rather to carry out a detailed investigation to identify the technical, infrastructural and training related shortcomings and speedily address them in a time bound manner. Using better construction techniques, the weight of the UAV can be brought down, enabling greater range and more payload. The Nishant System has the ingredients to come  good provided we sincerely apply ourselves. A review of why the navy has succeeded where the airforce and Army have failed in the indegenisation effort should be carried out and systemic deficiencies addressed.

The Call.

The Call

 

By Brig. Karan Singh Rathore (Retd).

In 1982, I was selected by General Hanut Singhji to be his ADC. It shaped up as a cherished and privileged association with the General. In this short narrative, walking down the memory lane, I share one instructive anecdotal incident.

I had reported as ADC to Maj Gen Hanut Singhji in October 1982 at HQ 17 Mountain Division, Gangtok, Sikkim. While I looked forward to serving under the great legend, there was also a sense of trepidation as to how would I measure up. 
Service under General Hanut Singhji was a great learning experience. An incident comes to my mind.

Lt Gen (then Maj Gen) Hanut Singhji, Sikkim 1983

An affray happened in Gangtok between some civilians and military personnel. Division HQ staff   were looking into the matter.

At around 7 PM in the evening, I get a call from the ADC to the Corps Commander that the Corps Commander would like to speak with the divisional commander, immediately. I informed him that the General was presently occupied however, the call would be put through moment he was free. General Hanut Singhji had given strict instructions that he was not to be disturbed after office hours, divisional staff would handle routine matters.

Well sure enough my phone rang after a short while and the exchange informed that the Corps Commander would like to speak with me.

"Son do you know who I am" the gruff voice spoke.

"Yes sir, you are the Corps Commander."

"Put me through to your GOC immediately", he said.

"Sir presently the GOC is busy, I will have the call put through the moment he is free."
"Haven't you heard me", I could sense the anger.

"Yes sir, but sir the General is busy at the moment" I repeated.

By this time I was at my wits end, as to have I mishandled the situation. I immediately informed Harbans (the sahayak) that I need an audience with the General the moment he gets up from dhyan.

At around 8pm General Saheb would have his porridge and milk. I was ushered in into a pristine bed room, predominantly appointed in white, the General was seated cross-legged on a white foam mattress, his porridge served on a low table in front of him. He was slowly stirring the porridge as I walked in. He continued stirring.

"Sir the Corps Commander rang up, wanted to speak with you, he was a little upset for not being able to speak with you."

The General continued to stir his porridge with the greatest deliberation. There was no change in his demeanor.

"Sir may I have the call put through."

"No Karan, I will talk to him tomorrow".

The next day, I presume the two Generals spoke. That was where the matter ended. It was not my place to delve further.

The brief incident, serves to illustrate the great strength of character and moral qualities of General Hanut Singhji. It well brings out how he would ensure that trivial matters were dealt by appropriate people. He was unflappable, cool, resilient and fearless.

Armies need role models. Officers and men require role models. They serve as a lighthouse that guides us, as we strive to navigate in this muddled unclear world. 
Indian Army in general and The Poona Horse in particular were privileged to have had General Hanut Singhji amongst us. We would be well advised to study his life and teachings, it will help us emerge better warriors.

It was a privilege to have served under the General.

Indian Navy Submarine Fleet Incidents: Another View

INS Sindhoghosh

 

On 19 February 2015, while conducting training off the coast of Mumbai, pertaining to launch of MARCOS from her torpedo tubes, Indian Navy Kilo (Sindhughosh Class) Submarine S55 INS Sindhughosh, collided with a fishing trawler and suffered damage to the periscope. This is the fifth major submarine incident reported in the media, involving Indian submarine fleet in the in the last three years. The collision is not a first for Sindhughosh, earlier in 2008, she had suffered a collision with a cargo ship MV Leeds Castle.

 

In August 2013, in one of the worst naval submarine incidents, Kilo class submarine S67 INS Sindhurakshak exploded while in harbour and sank with loss of 18 lives. Sindhurakshak was one of the newest boats in the Indian Kilo Class submarines. Commissioned in 1997, she had, in 2012, completed a complete refit and up gradation in Russia to Project 08773, which involved up gradation of its weapon and detection suite as also equipping the submarine to fire the 300 KM range 3M-54E Klub-S 

 

KLUB S Cruise Missile

cruise missiles. Five Kilos, Sindhughosh, Sindhuvir, Sindhuratna, Sindhuvijay and Sindhurakshak have been upgraded to Project 08773 standard to date at Zvezdochka Shipyard yard in Russia. These upgraded Kilos are a significant naval force multiplier and are acknowledged for their offensive capability, low noise characteristics and the ability to fire Klub S cruise missiles, posing a major threat to potential adversaries.  A sixth boat, Sindhukriti is undergoing a similar refit in Hindustan Shipyard limited (HSL) at Vishakhapatnam, since 2007. The yard was successful in taking apart the submarine, however it has been not so successful in putting it together again, and so INS Sindhukriti is  a write off as far as its counting in naval submarine capability is concerned. Obviously, accountability is not a major issue in HSL.

 

Coming back to the upgraded Kilos. Out of five major submarine incidents reported in the last five years, four have occurred on the upgraded Kilos and of the five upgraded boats, three have suffered damage to a varying degree. In August 2013, INS Sindhurakshak suffered catastrophic explosion and sank at Mumbai. Sindhuratna had a major fire incident in February 2014 and would presumably have to undergo major repairs possibly in Russia. Sindhughosh, has damaged her periscopes in collision with a fishing trawler in February 2015 and will also have to be docked for repairs. Only two upgraded Kilo Class submarines are now possibly fully operational. A desirable situation for our potential adversaries.

 

The degradation of our submarine capability is a serious issue and needs to be investigated in detail. All angles must be examined. For example, did Sindhughosh merely collide with the fishing trawler or was she intentionally rammed by the trawler.

 

Incidentally, no major incidents have been reported in the balance four non-upgraded Kilo Class Submarines or the four HDW Shishumar Class





Shishumar Class



 submarines, all of which have limited offensive capability; lacking the ability to fire cruise missiles.

 

From the incidents reported, two issues stand out. Firstly, is the matter of security of our submarine fleet and the second is the manner in which the submarines are being handled, leading to multiple incidents. In a comment on the Sindhurakshak tragedy, the present Naval Chief had remarked that when procedures are violated, such incidents occur. By implication, there have been leadership and operational lapses, wherein laid down procedures have been violated, leading to such incidents at sea or creating conditions which adversely impact on our strike capability. 

 

For instance, while operating in shallow waters off the coast of Mumbai, Sindhughosh should have been aware of local ship and boat activity. She is equipped with efficient modern passive and active detection systems like Sonar and Radar, available to her. How is it that she failed to detect the approaching fishing trawler speed and course and take actions to avoid collision. Was she operating without deploying her protection systems. If so it is a major operational lapse.

 

It would be a good idea if the navy would give greater cognisance to 'sea time spent in career' factor while selecting its naval captains and not allow the selection process to become a mere function of professional course results and staff appointments held, as is increasingly becoming the norm for the armed forces generically speaking. There would be naval officers who would love to be out sailing at sea, and there would be others who would be more comfortable doing a course for their own professional furtherance and / or seek a cushy shore job; away from the rigours of the sea and the associated responsibility and accountability of the ship and her company.

 

Such personnel, when catapulted into leadership positions, would literally speaking 'be out of their depth' on matters naval, and fail to run things the way they should be run. And these elements, having done the minimum sea time would scuttle back to their shore job. The navy needs to 'look inward'.