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| INS Sindhoghosh |
On 19 February 2015, while conducting training off the coast of Mumbai, pertaining to launch of MARCOS from her torpedo tubes, Indian Navy Kilo (Sindhughosh Class) Submarine S55 INS Sindhughosh, collided with a fishing trawler and suffered damage to the periscope. This is the fifth major submarine incident reported in the media, involving Indian submarine fleet in the in the last three years. The collision is not a first for Sindhughosh, earlier in 2008, she had suffered a collision with a cargo ship MV Leeds Castle.
In August 2013, in one of the worst naval submarine incidents, Kilo class submarine S67 INS Sindhurakshak exploded while in harbour and sank with loss of 18 lives. Sindhurakshak was one of the newest boats in the Indian Kilo Class submarines. Commissioned in 1997, she had, in 2012, completed a complete refit and up gradation in Russia to Project 08773, which involved up gradation of its weapon and detection suite as also equipping the submarine to fire the 300 KM range 3M-54E Klub-S
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| KLUB S Cruise Missile |
cruise missiles. Five Kilos, Sindhughosh, Sindhuvir, Sindhuratna, Sindhuvijay and Sindhurakshak have been upgraded to Project 08773 standard to date at Zvezdochka Shipyard yard in Russia. These upgraded Kilos are a significant naval force multiplier and are acknowledged for their offensive capability, low noise characteristics and the ability to fire Klub S cruise missiles, posing a major threat to potential adversaries. A sixth boat, Sindhukriti is undergoing a similar refit in Hindustan Shipyard limited (HSL) at Vishakhapatnam, since 2007. The yard was successful in taking apart the submarine, however it has been not so successful in putting it together again, and so INS Sindhukriti is a write off as far as its counting in naval submarine capability is concerned. Obviously, accountability is not a major issue in HSL.
Coming back to the upgraded Kilos. Out of five major submarine incidents reported in the last five years, four have occurred on the upgraded Kilos and of the five upgraded boats, three have suffered damage to a varying degree. In August 2013, INS Sindhurakshak suffered catastrophic explosion and sank at Mumbai. Sindhuratna had a major fire incident in February 2014 and would presumably have to undergo major repairs possibly in Russia. Sindhughosh, has damaged her periscopes in collision with a fishing trawler in February 2015 and will also have to be docked for repairs. Only two upgraded Kilo Class submarines are now possibly fully operational. A desirable situation for our potential adversaries.
The degradation of our submarine capability is a serious issue and needs to be investigated in detail. All angles must be examined. For example, did Sindhughosh merely collide with the fishing trawler or was she intentionally rammed by the trawler.
Incidentally, no major incidents have been reported in the balance four non-upgraded Kilo Class Submarines or the four HDW Shishumar Class
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| Shishumar Class |
submarines, all of which have limited offensive capability; lacking the ability to fire cruise missiles.
From the incidents reported, two issues stand out. Firstly, is the matter of security of our submarine fleet and the second is the manner in which the submarines are being handled, leading to multiple incidents. In a comment on the Sindhurakshak tragedy, the present Naval Chief had remarked that when procedures are violated, such incidents occur. By implication, there have been leadership and operational lapses, wherein laid down procedures have been violated, leading to such incidents at sea or creating conditions which adversely impact on our strike capability.
For instance, while operating in shallow waters off the coast of Mumbai, Sindhughosh should have been aware of local ship and boat activity. She is equipped with efficient modern passive and active detection systems like Sonar and Radar, available to her. How is it that she failed to detect the approaching fishing trawler speed and course and take actions to avoid collision. Was she operating without deploying her protection systems. If so it is a major operational lapse.
It would be a good idea if the navy would give greater cognisance to 'sea time spent in career' factor while selecting its naval captains and not allow the selection process to become a mere function of professional course results and staff appointments held, as is increasingly becoming the norm for the armed forces generically speaking. There would be naval officers who would love to be out sailing at sea, and there would be others who would be more comfortable doing a course for their own professional furtherance and / or seek a cushy shore job; away from the rigours of the sea and the associated responsibility and accountability of the ship and her company.
Such personnel, when catapulted into leadership positions, would literally speaking 'be out of their depth' on matters naval, and fail to run things the way they should be run. And these elements, having done the minimum sea time would scuttle back to their shore job. The navy needs to 'look inward'.
