With the crash of the fourth and last Nishant UAV held by the army, earlier this month, the army called it a day and informed DRDO that it would not be acquiring any more Nishants from them and that they may like to shut down the project.
DRDO made Nishant UAV is a catapult launched tactical aerial surveillance system. Visualised and designed in the 1990s, it was inducted last year finally after interminable trials. Indian Army opted to buy four Nishants and associated support systems. However, as the story unfolded, within an year of induction all four UAVs had crashed and now the army has informed DRDO, that they could scupper the program as no more Nishants would be ordered. It took DRDO 25 years and over 100 crores to operationalise four UAVs and have them all crash within an year of induction. The Nishant crashes are symptomatic of deep underlying malaise that has seeped into the very bones of DRDO and the services as far as production of indigenous defence systems are concerned. Till these deficiencies are addressed the sorry saga will re run time and again.
The slow grinding pace of DRDO is incomprehensible and unforgivable. The armed forces too are jointly responsible for this sad state of affairs and all these organisations need to pull redefine the manner in which they interact with each other.
The Nishant was designed based on an army QR. Air force took no interest in it. This was a fundamental error. Air Force had institutional knowledge of flying systems, also the UAV was being designed as a tactical UAV with a 150 km range, was very much in the close air support and battle field interdiction domain of the air force. The air force should have been part of the project from the start. It is inexcusable.
The DRDO, having obtained its QR (and more importantly the funding), feathered this nest so the project can last ad infinitum. Observe, DRDO brings few projects to effective operational conclusion. They do not involve any army or airforce experts in the design and trail phase. Notional army representation in the project is for administration and routine staff work with service HQs. The army and airforce, on the other hand, have no institution which they can throw up trained and aware officers and men who can meaningfully contribute to development of new defence systems. The Navy has such a cadre in shape of 'ship constructors' who contribute in a major manner to the conceptualisation of ship design and work in close coordination with Shipyards and DRDO. So note the success of naval warship construction. One nuclear submarine, the apex predator, is under trials and a handful more are under construction. As far as surface combatants is concerned we are self sufficient. An excellent state.
The other two services have nothing to show. The fault lies not with the people, but rather in the existing organisation and attitude. This compartmentalisation has to be ruthlessly broken up.
So coming back to Nishant. It is the heaviest catapult launched UAV in the world. At 350 kg weight, it requires a massive 14 ton pneumatic catapult system to throw it in the air. They could have chosen JATO packs for the purpose, however its capability to launch a heavy body in such short distance remains a question mark. Now most of other catapult launched systems are comparatively light weight, their parachute recovery is a simpler affair. Not so in the case of Nishant. At 350 kg it required a larger parachute system, had higher ground impact, hence needed stronger construction (more weight) and suffered more damage on recovery. See how a fundamental error in design has a cascading effect. It could have been avoided if there was a clear appreciation of present and future operating conditions and if there was a cadre of personnel who were trained to think in such a manner.
The launch limitations of the Nishant had other downsides too. There would be a restriction on its payload as there is only that much weight that you can throw up using a catapult. So it had limited fuel (range), limited capability to carry optronic packages, thus defeating the very purpose of its existence. No doubt the army was against inducting such a lemon system.
The catapult launch system offers some major advantages, the chief one being, the flexibility of launching from anywhere and recovery without need of extensive ground infrastructure like runway etc. Large number of tactical UAVs use catapult launch as a preferred mode. However in its 25 year of existence the launch and recovery system of Nishant does not seem to have been improved upon or recourse made to newer technologies. DRDO as much to answer for. What it successfully achieved was to keep the services out of the developmental cycle, to the detriment of system capability. Not that the services were overly keen to get involved as long as they could import systems.
Incidentally lack of suitable tactical surveillance systems with day night capability is translating into physical casualties to our troops as they operate with inadequate situational awareness due to lack of real time information, for which UAV is a preferred tool. There has to be accountability. we recently lost a second colonel this year.
The way forward is not to dunk the Nishant system as the army has deigned, but rather to carry out a detailed investigation to identify the technical, infrastructural and training related shortcomings and speedily address them in a time bound manner. Using better construction techniques, the weight of the UAV can be brought down, enabling greater range and more payload. The Nishant System has the ingredients to come good provided we sincerely apply ourselves. A review of why the navy has succeeded where the airforce and Army have failed in the indegenisation effort should be carried out and systemic deficiencies addressed.
DRDO made Nishant UAV is a catapult launched tactical aerial surveillance system. Visualised and designed in the 1990s, it was inducted last year finally after interminable trials. Indian Army opted to buy four Nishants and associated support systems. However, as the story unfolded, within an year of induction all four UAVs had crashed and now the army has informed DRDO, that they could scupper the program as no more Nishants would be ordered. It took DRDO 25 years and over 100 crores to operationalise four UAVs and have them all crash within an year of induction. The Nishant crashes are symptomatic of deep underlying malaise that has seeped into the very bones of DRDO and the services as far as production of indigenous defence systems are concerned. Till these deficiencies are addressed the sorry saga will re run time and again.
The slow grinding pace of DRDO is incomprehensible and unforgivable. The armed forces too are jointly responsible for this sad state of affairs and all these organisations need to pull redefine the manner in which they interact with each other.
The Nishant was designed based on an army QR. Air force took no interest in it. This was a fundamental error. Air Force had institutional knowledge of flying systems, also the UAV was being designed as a tactical UAV with a 150 km range, was very much in the close air support and battle field interdiction domain of the air force. The air force should have been part of the project from the start. It is inexcusable.
The DRDO, having obtained its QR (and more importantly the funding), feathered this nest so the project can last ad infinitum. Observe, DRDO brings few projects to effective operational conclusion. They do not involve any army or airforce experts in the design and trail phase. Notional army representation in the project is for administration and routine staff work with service HQs. The army and airforce, on the other hand, have no institution which they can throw up trained and aware officers and men who can meaningfully contribute to development of new defence systems. The Navy has such a cadre in shape of 'ship constructors' who contribute in a major manner to the conceptualisation of ship design and work in close coordination with Shipyards and DRDO. So note the success of naval warship construction. One nuclear submarine, the apex predator, is under trials and a handful more are under construction. As far as surface combatants is concerned we are self sufficient. An excellent state.
The other two services have nothing to show. The fault lies not with the people, but rather in the existing organisation and attitude. This compartmentalisation has to be ruthlessly broken up.
So coming back to Nishant. It is the heaviest catapult launched UAV in the world. At 350 kg weight, it requires a massive 14 ton pneumatic catapult system to throw it in the air. They could have chosen JATO packs for the purpose, however its capability to launch a heavy body in such short distance remains a question mark. Now most of other catapult launched systems are comparatively light weight, their parachute recovery is a simpler affair. Not so in the case of Nishant. At 350 kg it required a larger parachute system, had higher ground impact, hence needed stronger construction (more weight) and suffered more damage on recovery. See how a fundamental error in design has a cascading effect. It could have been avoided if there was a clear appreciation of present and future operating conditions and if there was a cadre of personnel who were trained to think in such a manner.
The launch limitations of the Nishant had other downsides too. There would be a restriction on its payload as there is only that much weight that you can throw up using a catapult. So it had limited fuel (range), limited capability to carry optronic packages, thus defeating the very purpose of its existence. No doubt the army was against inducting such a lemon system.
The catapult launch system offers some major advantages, the chief one being, the flexibility of launching from anywhere and recovery without need of extensive ground infrastructure like runway etc. Large number of tactical UAVs use catapult launch as a preferred mode. However in its 25 year of existence the launch and recovery system of Nishant does not seem to have been improved upon or recourse made to newer technologies. DRDO as much to answer for. What it successfully achieved was to keep the services out of the developmental cycle, to the detriment of system capability. Not that the services were overly keen to get involved as long as they could import systems.
Incidentally lack of suitable tactical surveillance systems with day night capability is translating into physical casualties to our troops as they operate with inadequate situational awareness due to lack of real time information, for which UAV is a preferred tool. There has to be accountability. we recently lost a second colonel this year.
The way forward is not to dunk the Nishant system as the army has deigned, but rather to carry out a detailed investigation to identify the technical, infrastructural and training related shortcomings and speedily address them in a time bound manner. Using better construction techniques, the weight of the UAV can be brought down, enabling greater range and more payload. The Nishant System has the ingredients to come good provided we sincerely apply ourselves. A review of why the navy has succeeded where the airforce and Army have failed in the indegenisation effort should be carried out and systemic deficiencies addressed.
