"THE SAFETY HONOUR AND WELFARE OF YOUR COUNTRY COME FIRST ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME. THE HONOUR, WELFARE AND COMFORT OF THE MEN YOU COMMAND COME NEXT. YOUR OWN EASE, COMFORT AND SAFETY COME LAST, ALWAYS AND EVERY TIME."
Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode
IMA,10th December 1932
On 21st November 1962, sixty two years ago, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced a withdrawal to pre conflict lines, thus bringing to an end the Sino Indian conflict of 1962. Earlier the cadence of Sino Indian border dispute had erupted into a full blown border war on 20th October 1962, with the Chinese PLAA attacking and destroying Indian 7 Infantry Brigade on the Namka Chu rivulet in Tawang sector, in a matter of few hours. By 22nd October the historic monastery town of Tawang had been evacuated and fell to the Chinese. After a tactical pause, combat operations resumed on 17th November. By 19th November, the PLAA had completed the destruction of the Indian 4 Infantry Division capturing in the process the formidable mountain passes of Se La and Bomdi La, each defended by an Indian infantry brigade and thereon advancing beyond Tenga. The plains of Assam lay open to Chinese occupation. Prime Minister Nehru gave out his farewell "our hearts go out to the people of Assam" speech and Tezpur was evacuated.
The unilateral ceasefire declared by the Chinese on 21st November brought an end to this sordid and humiliating saga that saw the nadir of Indian force-at-arms. Sordid, as it represented a total failure of Indian military leadership and humiliating as India plaintively approached world powers to bail her out of her predicament. The disgrace of Indian Army and the Indian Armed Forces was complete and the nation humbled and in shock.
Even today, after a lapse of sixty two years Indian military professionals wince at the mention of the 1962 war and the reverberations of that conflict ring loud and hard in the ears of present day Indian civil and military leadership. Our current dealings with China are in a major way influenced and shaped by that experience. In my opinion, as an army we are yet to expurgate the humiliation of that defeat, as we are still to acknowledge the underlying single most important reason for this defeat . That reason was complete and total failure of military leadership at all levels i.e strategic, operational and tactical. Other reasons were peripheral.
Tensions between India and China had been building up since mid 1950's when it was discovered that China had occupied Indian territory of Aksai Chin and had constructed a road in 1956 across the region, connecting Tibet and Sinkiang. Initially responsibility for the managing the Sino Indian border was under the Ministry of External Affairs and thereafter under the Home Ministry, a most questionable arrangement as later events were to prove. Indian Army was handed over the responsibility of the Eastern Theater only in 1959-60 when increasing border incidents went beyond the capability of Home Ministry and IB police forces to handle. The government of the day declared the launch of the 'Forward Policy' which required Indian Army to establish posts well forward along stated Indian claim lines. The government insisted on implementation of the policy, despite the fact that most of the posts, on account of poor/non existent infrastructure, were logistically unsustainable and exposed to Chinese counter action. The Chinese on the other hand had built up their lines of communication in keeping with their operational plans for application military power. We were majorly lagging in the logistic capability and sustenance loop at the outset of the war. The results of the conflict were a resonance of that neglect.
The 'Forward Policy' directive was backstopped by Nehru's and IIB's assertion that "the Chinese will not attack", which the army's apex leadership willingly accepted as a truism and proceeded to unquestioningly implement the policy without paying professional heed to the battle indicators which pointed otherwise
It was thus that in September 1962, 7 Infantry brigade of 4 Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier John Dalvi, found itself deployed along the indefensible Namka Chu rivulet, with orders to throw the Chinese off the Thag La ridge. As per India the boundary ran along Thag La ridge. The directive to clear Thag La (Operation Leghorn) had been ordered by the government and accepted by the Army Chief General PN Thapar. Earlier, General Thapar had been appointed as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in 1961 over the head of Lt General SPP Thorat. The outgoing Chief General KS Thimayya had recommended General Thorat for the post of COAS, however Thorat was overlooked in favor of Thapar . It is worth noting that Lt General Thorat as GOC-in-C Eastern Command in 1959 consequent to an operational assessment 'Exercise Lal Quila' had correctly predicted likely Chinese play along our eastern borders and had submitted a counter plan through the then COAS General Thimayya. The plan was summarily dismissed by Krishna Menon. The other key player of significance was Lt General BM Kaul, an ASC officer and favourite of Nehru. He had earlier been catapulted to the operationaliy vital post of Chief of General Staff (CGS), despite his appointment being opposed by General Thimayya on professional grounds.
Brigadier John Dalvi was a bright upcoming officer and as a professional he would have well assessed that by being ordered forward to deploy along the Namka Chu, his brigade was in a grievously dangerous and exposed position, given the lack of fire support and almost non existent logistics. He very well knew that undertaking an offensive against the Chinese under such circumstances would be suicidal. Meanwhile, Kaul had taken over the command of newly raised HQ 4 Corps, responsible for defense of Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA), while Lt General Umrao Singh GOC 33 Corps, who had refused to be a party to the government's forward policy in NEFA, which as per him was militarily unsustainable and dangerous, was shifted to the dormant Sikkim sector and taken out of reckoning.
Kaul visited 7 Brigade in October and ordered commencement of 'Operation Leghorn' for capture of Thag La ridge from the Chinese. It was at this juncture Dalvi failed his brigade and his country. He had so deployed his brigade that while it met the forward policy requirement of holding the Namka Chu, it was not disposed to undertake a defensive posture and fight a viable battle, leave alone undertake offensive operations. He could have instead chosen to establish screen positions along the Namka Chu and deploy the major portion of his brigade on the Tsandhar / Hatung La ridge that lay immediately to his rear. This deployment would have enabled 7 Infantry Brigade to give a good account of itself in the coming battle.
Dalvi failed to give his command a fighting chance. That was his professional and moral failure.
Dalvi failed to give his command a fighting chance. That was his professional and moral failure.
In his book Himalayan Blunder Dalvi writes that he was all along against the directive to deploy along the Namka Chu. If that be so, at this critical juncture what stopped him from taking the right step. At worst he could have asked to be removed from command or as the field commander he could have insisted on not being dictated on how the assigned mission is to be executed. Brigadier Dalvi was a bright officer with an outstanding military record, he possibly was not willing to jeopardize his military career by standing up to General Kaul's flawed directions and thus ended up sacrificing his brigade. On 17th October when the Chinese attacked, the 7 Infantry Brigade was destroyed in a matter of two hours suffering 493 killed. 2 Rajput alone suffered 282 Killed and 80 wounded out of a strength of 513 all ranks. As a military leader Dalvi failed to do the right thing towards his country and his men. He violated the Chetwodian motto and placed his own good before that of his country and his command. John Dalvi was captured by the Chinese on 18th October and so were the three commanding officers of his brigade.
Major General Niranjan Prasad was GOC 4 Infantry Division. All through this episode he played a dormant role and failed to effectively influence the events as they played out. Professionally he was disagreeing with his Corps Commander General BM Kaul on the way 7 Infantry Brigade was deployed, yet at end of the day he buckled and went along with Kaul. Major General Niranjan Prasad was removed from command after the Namka Chu debacle. In 1965 however, he was resurrected professionally and handed over command of 15 Infantry Division. He again failed that test during the Indo-Pak 1965 war and for the second time in a row was removed from command in battle.
Lt General BM Kaul was Nehru's protege. He was an ASC officer with no operational experience and appointed as CGS despite the Chief General Thimayya's opposition. When Lt General K Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps, the formation responsible for defense of NEFA put his foot down on undertaking the Forward Policy without logistic backup, a new formation 4 Corps was ordered to be raised and Lt General BM Kaul appointed GOC. The inconvenient Lt General Umrao Singh and his 33 Corps were shifted to Sikkim sector which was fairly dormant. This happened in 1962, in the face of a major Chinese build up.
The issue at hand is not that the events as stated occurred, rather it is more important to examine as to how the office of the COAS and that of HQ Eastern Command (Lt General LP Sen), went along with these instructions, fully cognizant that we were setting up for a disaster against the Chinese PLAA. It is said that Kaul was looking to be the COAS at a later point in time and for that command of a Corps was an essential pre requisite, while General LP Sen saw himself as the next COAS after Thapar and before Kaul. Hence it appears that their actions were not driven by the Chetwodian motto but rather perversely placed their own good before everything else. Thereby they went along with a policy of the Government, which they would have realised professionally, was intrinsically flawed. The officers should have put in their resignations rather than be a party to such ventures.
Why did 4 Infantry Division fail in 1962 ? In that era Indian Army was lacking in basic armaments on account of gross neglect by the Government. However it was not an army lacking in experience. Most of the JCOs and Commanding Officers had fought during WW2. Well led, the formation would have given a good account of itself. However the higher military leadership thrown up at that time did not elicit the faith of the rank and file. The war experienced Officers and men of 7 Infantry Brigade would have known that they had been set up by being deployed in a linear fashion along a mountain stream, totally dominated by Chinese forces deployed on the Thag La ridge. They were aware that if the Chinese attacked, the brigade had no fighting chance. An atmosphere of self before everything else permeated deep in the army mirroring the attitude of the higher military leadership. It was for that reason that the army failed. There were exceptions, units like 2 Rajput fought to the bitter end. The officers and men of 4 Infantry Division would have known that their corps commander was there to implement his personal agenda and as such was not worthy to be looked up to for leadership in critical situations.
On the other hand in Ladakh sector under the steady hand on Brig TN Raina, 114 Infantry Brigade fought a well planned battle bringing the Chinese offensive to a halt at Chushul. The Western Army Commander Lt General Daulet Singh was proactive in anticipating the impending Chinese offensive and ensured that his formations were prepared to take it on, in stark contrast to Eastern Theatre.
In the various media articles on this conflict, an oft asked question was can the army fail again. It is a complex issue. In various other professional domains we get to observe failure of leadership and poor moral attitude. These misdemeanors of leadership, though abhorrent, in themselves do not impinge on national security as immensely as would a failure in military leadership. The 1962 debacle was the result of a self oriented attitude that had grown roots in our army with encouragement from certain government and bureaucratic quarters. In the process merit and competence was given the go-by. Outspoken and competent officers like General Umrao Singh and General Shiv Verma were sidelined. General Thorat as mentioned earlier, was overlooked for the post of COAS. General Manekshaw too was sidelined and investigated against for being anti-national !
As long as Indian armed forces place merit and quality leadership to be the sole determinants to judge performance and a parameter for selection for higher responsibility, we will continue to throw up top class leadership, that will ensure that the security of the country is strengthened.
The next conflicts will be hybrid in nature, with no clearly delineated time line of peace and war. It will require top class of military leaders imbued with the spirit of the Chetwodian motto, read the right way.
In recent times, certain negative trends have crept in which require to be arrested. First is the 'mandalisation' of the army with higher rank promotional vacancies based on respective physical strength of various arms and services. This has been the first step towards giving merit the go-by and will have adverse effects and will resonate with time. Mediocrity will threaten to take roots and this has to be guarded against. This 'mandalisation' has triggered a sort of turf war between arms and services to retain or enhance their domains, thereby leading to further dilution of of the time tested principle of merit and setting into motion various plays and manipulations that certainly do not do the army proud, there are adequate articles in the media on such issues. As a first step, the army and the government needs to redefine merit and the understanding of term military leadership and thereafter implement it. General Staff officers must move away from their regimental obsession and their shedding the regimental accoutrements would be a firm step in that direction as has recently been implemented by the government. An army poorly led turns into rabble as what happened in the Eastern sector in 1962, well led, they will do the nation proud.
The Chinaman is a wily adversary. He does not follow the well understood concept of peace and war. For him all time is war time, only the methodology and instruments change. Our armed forces in particular and the nation in general must take a perspective of this emerged threat and prepare to deal with it. The Chinese have shown a propensity of using armed force and to be fair to them they have stated thus clearly in various forums. For example try sending Indian ships into South China sea as the Chinese sent their PLAN submarines to Sri Lanka, and watch their aggressive reaction, thereafter.
We must shift our focus in a major way eastwards. For example, at least fifty percent NDA cadets must take up Chinese as their foreign language. We need to read what they write, understand what they say and comprehend how they think and react. Presently our knowledge of the Chinese military and their civilizational attitudes is only peripheral and dependant on western texts and media. There is a need to carry out intensive study of their military norms, practices, tactics and operational strategy to fashion our response. The Chinese army system does not trace its roots to western military traditions. They have their own systems and methodology to which most are unfamiliar. The Japanese were the military Guru's of PLA. It was in the hard fought Sino - Japanese war that PLA and its leadership cut its teeth. The Chinese army adopted some of the best practices of the Japanese army; an orientation towards aggressive maneuver warfare being one of them. This was highlighted in the Korean war where the American army was worsted in the Chosin reservoir battles on the Yalu river and was to be seen again in the rapid advance of the PLA in Tawang and Walong sectors in 1962, completely out maneuvering our forces deployed there.
The Chinaman has his weaknesses too. The Vietnamese analysed them well. In a way the Chinese and Vietnamese have very similar military organisation, battle attitudes and procedures. In the 1979 Sino Vietnam war, the Vietnamese were able to successfully blunt the Chinese offensive inflicting huge casualties in the process. We need to align very closely militarily and politically with Vietnam, there is much to be learned from them. Vietnamese and Japanese would be militarily useful languages that our officers need to learn to help them 'know their adversary' better. It would be a step in the right direction, for the armed forces were to set up a joint operational school, whose sole purpose would be to stare at the Chinaman, decipher him and pass it on to the soldiery, to enable them to prepare better.
History has lessons for us and we need to take note. The failure of Ibrahim Lodhi and Rana Sangha to take note of the introduction of gunpowder weapons by the Portugese in the 1490s and their likely impact on warfare led to their defeat at Panipat and Khanwa in 1526 and1527 respectively, leading to the establishment of Mughal rule in India.
In the recent air show at Zhuhai, China put on show its latest 6th Generation fighter the 'White Emperor' on diplay as also two 5th Generation fighters J20 and J35 which are already in wide spread service with them. They also had on display twelve types of aircraft engines. On the other hand our own AMCA and Kaveri still struggle on the design board. The unveiling of the Chinese light tank the T15 Black Panther had us stampeding to develop our own. Point is why was the light tank project not undertaken earlier if an operational need was identified for the same. Recent reports in the media indicate that PLAA brigades have been allotted integral UAV companies and by inference we can assume that their divisions would be feilding UAV battalions and higher level capabilities at Corps and Army levels. On the other hand we still appear to be on the starting block in integrating drones in our warfighting as is highlighted by our lack of such systems in the COIN ops that we are fighting in J&K. Our usage is peripheral at the moment as it seems to appear.
The rapidity with which Chinese PLA imbibes new technology in its operational organisation and functioning is something which we need to observe closely as it will have a major bearing in any future conflict.
The above pointers are indicative of an imperfect structure of our Military Industrial Complex. The Russians have at the apex level their 'Military Industrial Commission of Russia' directly reporting to the President. The Chinese have a similar body called 'The Equiment Development Department of Chinese Military Commission'. Such concentration of effort brings about efficiency, accountability and focussed development and quick decision making. Our RFP and GSQR driven system is outmoded as it places the developer and the user in us v/s them camps with the bureaucrat playing both ends. Fundamentally it boils down to sound leadership taking sound decisions.
We cannot afford to be redeployed on the Namka Chu outplayed in the OODA loop.
We need to acknowledge ad analyse the failure of our army in 1962. Examine in depth the reasons for the military debacle, imbibe the lessons well so that similar mistakes are not repeated in future. We must analyse in detail the reasons for failure of military leadership, draw the right conclusions and implement them in our leadership training at all levels. High quality military leadership must be defined in unambiguous terms and steps taken to implement it. It will strengthen our forces immensely.
We must guard against the culture of 'appointees'. We walked that way once, much to our discomfort.
As Carl Von Clausewitz said " Woe to the Government, which relying on halfhearted politics and a shackled military policy meets a foe, who like the untamed mighty forces of nature, knows no law other than his own."
